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ABSTRACT 
 
Vietnam has made remarkable achievements in economic growth, poverty reduction and 
improvement of food security. However, disparities between rural and urban as well as upland and 
lowland areas still exist. Upland areas account for 75% of Vietnam‟s land surface and contain many 
valuable natural resources, including most of the forests in Vietnam. They are also home to some of 
Vietnam‟s poorest people, many of them members of ethnic minority groups. 
Improving ethnic minorities‟ land management systems and reforesting barren hills have been two 
major aims for policy makers. Numerous programs have been implemented in mountainous areas 
but have frequently failed to achieve its objectives. Both the formulation and implementation of 
these policies and programs have been criticised. Specifically, the top-down approach of the 
government and its failure to recognise local informal institutions and the strategies that shape 
household decision-making, has produced unintended results. 
Since the 1990s, numerous international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have started 
working in the country; most delivering services related to agricultural development and natural 
resource management in rural areas. Unlike government intervention, international NGO 
development programmes and projects often employ a bottom-up approach in order to represent the 
most marginalised groups in society. However, the contrast between government and NGO 
intervention poses a challenge to NGOs working in Vietnam. The enabling and constraining factors 
of planned intervention by both the Vietnamese government and international NGOs are analysed 
using a case study of CARE international as a representative example of NGOs working in 
Vietnam. Household decision-making is often affected by government policies in unintended ways, 
and complex, heterogonous communities are often the product of both external influence and the 
uncertain natural and social environments found in mountainous areas. This limits the operational 
space of NGOs whose activities are determined by pre-planned project designs. These NGOs often 
use approaches based on the transfer of technology through innovative farmers and project-created 
organisations as a means of intervention. However, this approach rests upon the assumption that 
target communities are cohesive and homogenous, which often is not the case.  
Based on the government programs and NGO projects analysed, planned intervention mostly 
benefits households that already possess significant human and social capital and are able to 
strategically incorporate elements in existing livelihood strategies. Many other actors are 
constrained by intervention as a result of dependency on consumer goods, inputs, technology for 
intensive farming, as well as issues of inequality and debt. 
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1. Introduction 
Vietnam is often singled out for its remarkable achievements in economic growth, poverty 
reduction and improvement of food security. Economic growth has accelerated since the Doi Moi 
reforms of 1986 and has managed to significantly increase per capita income, even among the 
poorest sections of the population (Bergeret, 2002). During the 1990s, GDP increased at a rate of 
8% per year and per capita income rose from US$220 in 1994 to US$640 in 2005. In addition, the 
percentage of the population living in acute poverty declined from 57% in the 1980s to 7% in 2005 
(Vien et al, 2006). In 1989 Vietnam achieved national food security and has now become the 
world‟s second leading exporter of rice (UNDP, 2000; cited by Peters, 2001).  
Despite Vietnam‟s relatively equitable growth, disparities between rural and urban areas still exist. 
More than 90% of poor households are located in rural areas, and 80% of poor households depend 
on farming or other uses of natural resources (CARE, 2004a). In addition, most of the achievements 
have occurred in the lowlands and increasing disparities exist between upland and lowland areas 
(Vien et al, 2006). Severe malnutrition persists in mountain communities of Northern Vietnam, in 
some districts of Central Vietnam, and in the Central Highlands (Bergeret, 2002). Poverty is most 
widespread among people living in the mountainous Northwest region where 68% of the population 
fell under the World Bank poverty line in 2002 (CARE, 2004a). Highland areas are significant since 
75% of Vietnam‟s land surface is characterised as sloping land, the highest percentage of any Asian 
country (Vien et al, 2006; Clement et al; 2006). The uplands contain many valuable natural 
resources including most of the forests in Vietnam and are also home to 28 million people (Vien et 
al, 2006), the majority of which belong to the 54 officially recognized minority groups in the 
country. Poverty among ethnic minorities is highly concentrated in populations that live in 
mountainous areas (CARE, 2004a). 
Mountainous areas have increasingly been incorporated in Vietnam‟s development strategies, and 
are gradually being integrated in the process of national modernisation and industrialisation (Binh, 
1998). The central government in Vietnam considers mobilisation of the vast stocks of natural 
resources in highland provinces as being integral for future economic development. Since 1986 the 
Vietnamese government has adopted numerous development policies focusing on upland areas, 
including the formation of markets, removing restrictions on which crops to grow, and improving 
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transportation and communication networks (Vien et al, 2006). In addition, major national programs 
that address health, education, basic infrastructure, and credit for the poor have been implemented 
during the 1990s, which have often specifically targeted ethnic minority communities (CARE, 
2004a). Improving ethnic minorities‟ land management systems and reforesting barren hills have 
been two major aims for policy makers which have been justified by a dual concern for economic 
development and environmental protection. However, some studies indicate that the real reasons 
include political concerns (Sowerwine, 2004; cited by Clement et al, 2006) and that eradication of 
swidden cultivation remains a central goal of upland development programs (Vien et al, 2006). Both 
the formulation and implementation of these policies and programs have frequently been criticised 
(Binh, 1998). The most common critique relates to the government‟s top-down approach, the highly 
technology-based service delivery in mountainous areas, and its failure to incorporate local 
resources and livelihoods in planned intervention. Specifically, the failure to recognise local 
informal institutions and the strategies that shape household decision-making has produced 
unintended results. Practical implications, such as the lack of funding for government departments 
and agencies located in remote areas also weaken the implementation of programs due to lack of 
staff members, vehicles, and equipment (Binh, 1998).  
As a response to Vietnam‟s more open international profile since the 1990s, numerous international 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have started working in the country; most delivering 
services related to agricultural development and natural resource management in rural areas (Binh, 
1998). The top-down approach of government intervention differs significantly from those of 
international NGOs whose development programmes and projects often employ a bottom-up 
approach in order to represent the most marginalised groups in society. Intervention efforts are 
carried out by promoting grassroots development and supporting or creating civil society 
movements through the use of participatory methods such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). 
Community-based natural resource management is frequently viewed as a means to achieve 
sustainable environmental and economic development and the common approach to development in 
resource-dependent communities often rests upon the assumption that modest external influence - 
often through dissemination of technology packages and project-created civil society organisations - 
will enable households to lift themselves out of poverty. However, the contrast between government 
and NGO intervention poses a challenge to NGOs working in Vietnam. The effects of government 
policies and the complexities of rural mountainous communities often limit the scope of NGO 
activities, which rely on temporally defined projects which have measurable and tangible outcomes.  
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The aim of this thesis is to uncover the enabling and constraining factors of planned 
intervention by the Vietnamese government and international NGOs focusing on the implications 
for the average household. A central part of the analysis uses a case study of a CARE International 
project in Son La province in North-western Vietnam based on field work conducted in 2006.  
In order to fully address the implications of planned intervention three central research questions 
will be analysed and answered successively:     
What are the effects of government policies on household decision-making and the pursuit of 
sustainable livelihoods?  
How is the operational space of international NGOs in Vietnam affected by processes of negotiation 
and accommodation with government institutions and intended beneficiaries? 
What means of intervention do international NGOs employ to achieve their objectives? 
The thesis is structured around four main chapters. The next two chapters are a presentation of the 
theories used in the analysis, and a description of the methodological approach and field methods. 
Following the methodology is a two-part chapter containing the central analysis and discussion. 
Lastly, the conclusions drawn from the results of the analysis make up the final chapter. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical background for the analysis in this report draws upon three conceptual frameworks: 
an actor-oriented approach, the extended environmental entitlements theory, and the sustainable 
rural livelihoods framework.  
2.1. An actor-oriented approach 
In this report an actor-oriented approach, as formulated by Norman Long in  
“Development Sociology: Actors perspectives” (2001), is used in the central analysis. Using this 
approach makes it possible to examine the decision-making of central actors. Furthermore, it 
constitutes a counter-approach to more conventional structural analyses used in development 
research. It is Long‟s contention that the focus on external forces in structural analysis does not 
leave sufficient room for considering how affected groups or „internal‟ actors interpret, mediate and 
transform intervention. In other words it is necessary to place equal emphasis on both internal and 
external aspects and their interplay in any attempt to predict or fully grasp the outcomes of a given 
development intervention. This approach does acknowledge structure in so much as different social 
forms develop under similar structural circumstances. However in an actor-oriented approach more 
attention is given to the fact that different actors perceive the same situation in different ways and 
the differences in behaviour is the result of actively knowing and feeling subjects, not the 
differential impact of broad social forces. In this regard the concept of agency is central to an 
analysis of a development intervention. (Long, 2001)    
2.1.1. Social actors and agency 
Using an actor-oriented approach entails the identification and analysis of social actors that interact 
with each other in the context of a planned intervention. Planned intervention in the context of this 
thesis would mean implementation of specific government policies related to upland cultivators, the 
involvement of international NGOs in rural upland development, and the combined effects of both 
government and NGO intervention. 
A social actor is defined as a social entity that has agency, meaning the knowledge and capabilities 
to interpret or assess a problem or situation as well as producing a certain response or action. This is 
central to decision-making by households and its consequences, which is often based on the careful 
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consideration of costs and benefits. The response can impact upon the actor‟s own and other actors‟ 
actions and interpretations. Social actors encompass (and agency can thus be attributed to) 
individual persons, informal groups, interpersonal networks, organisations, as well as national 
governments or international organisations. Moreover, agency can be attributed to objects and ideas 
that can influence actors‟ perceptions and capability for action (Long, 2001: pp.240-241).  
2.1.2. Lifeworlds, livelihoods and social interfaces 
In addition to having agency, social actors are characterised by their „lifeworlds‟, which are their 
own „lived-in‟ or „taken for granted‟ social worlds that produce certain actions, interactions and 
meanings. A lifeworld is itself the product of the actor‟s personal experiences, relationships, 
intentions and values. Different actors‟ lifeworlds may and often do conflict with each other at 
critical points in a social setting (Long, 2001: p.54, pp.240-243). Long calls these points „social 
interfaces‟, which are the scenarios in which different lifeworlds intersect and where actors attempt 
to accommodate to or struggle against each others differing social worlds. These interfaces are 
played out in „social fields‟ which are social spaces where heterogeneous elements (material 
resources, information, technology, institutions, social relationships, discourses) are distributed. 
How these fields are ordered and how the elements are distributed depend upon the ongoing 
negotiation processes and struggles between the different actors involved (Long, 2001: pp.57-58). A 
social field can be further specified according to what the main interest or concern is - in the case of 
this report environmental or agricultural concerns. 
Central to an analysis of interfaces or fields of conflict is the concept of livelihoods. It is especially 
important in the analysis of this report since the concept of „sustainable livelihoods‟ forms a 
significant part of the theoretical framework used in the analysis. Long defines livelihoods as 
follows: 
“…practices by which individuals and groups strive to make a living, meet their consumption 
necessities, cope with adversities and uncertainties, engage with new opportunities, protect existing 
or pursue new lifestyles and cultural identifications, and fulfil their social obligations.” (Long, 
2001: p.241). 
This definition indicates that a livelihood entails more than simply making a living and includes 
cultural connotations such as identity formation and styles of living. As an example in the context 
of planned intervention by a government or non-government agency, this would signify that a local 
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farmer might choose to adapt to the intervention through a change of lifestyle and engage with the 
new opportunities it brings or that he might choose to protect the existing cultural practices and 
lifestyles through a conscious or unconscious „rejection‟ of the intervention (Long, 2001: p.241). 
Households‟ coping strategies often play an important part in these situations and can determine 
how much lifestyles are changed.   
2.1.3. Domains and arenas of conflict 
Long also introduces the concepts of social „domains‟ and „arenas‟ which are central to the analysis 
of social interfaces and fields, especially in the context of planned intervention by a government or 
international development agency. While the social field illustrates the availability and distribution 
of the elements or resources in question and the presence of social allies or enemies, the concepts of 
domains and arenas enable the analysis of the processes of ordering, regulating and negotiating of 
resource utilisation, social values, authority and power.  
A social domain implies an area of social life characterised by a set of rules, values, and norms that 
involves a level of social commitment. Examples of social domains include the family, the 
community, and the state. These values, rules, and norms become increasingly visible at interfaces 
where different domains are in conflict with each other. Arenas are the social situations where 
confrontation between actors and contests over resources, values and issues take place. It is in social 
arenas that actors employ discourses in order to build up alliances and position themselves 
strategically as a way to invest in the attainment of goals in the future. A certain social arena can 
either encompass several domains that are in conflict or it can be a situation within one social 
domain where the discrepancies in the common set of values, rules or norms are discussed and 
transformed according to different actor interests and/or agendas (Long, 2001: pp.57-59).  
When social actors secure livelihoods it is not only critical to have access to resources. The ability 
to generate capabilities from the resources is equally important. Endowments and entitlements are 
the means by which capabilities may be enhanced. Theses concepts are described in the next 
subchapter.  
2.2. Environmental entitlements analysis 
The concept of entitlements was originally developed and published by Amartya Sen in 1981. Sen 
used the concept of endowments and entitlements to analyse and describe the underlying causes of 
 8 
starvation in situations where there was an adequate supply of food. The central notion of this 
theory was that scarcity of food resources stems from the fact that people have differential access to 
food and not lack of food in absolute terms (Sen, 1981, cited by Leach et al, 1999). This conceptual 
framework has been adopted and transformed by Melissa Leach, Robin Mearns and Ian Scoones as 
a tool for conducting and evaluating development interventions and as a counter-approach to 
current narratives and discourses related to poverty-environment linkages and Community Based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) initiatives (Leach et al, 1999; Mearns, 1996). The 
framework also addresses the lack of focus on humanly devised institutions surrounding natural 
resource management in sustainable development theory. This standpoint argues that focus should 
be shifted away from natural resources themselves and towards an understanding of the institutions 
that mediate the use of natural resources in intended and unintended ways (Mearns, 1996: 105).  
Many studies have asserted that poverty and environmental change are linked directly. These are 
often referred to as „vicious circle‟ approaches: either poverty causes environmental degradation or 
vica versa. While these causal links may be present, it is important to question the scale at which 
they operate and to what extent the rural peasant is to blame for environmental degradation. 
Similarly it is often asserted that population growth contributes to environmental degradation 
despite the fact a number of studies have shown that under certain circumstances more people can 
mean more and better management of resources. In these situations it is rarely population increase 
alone that is the driving factor. Rather it is certain institutional forms that permit creative 
management of resources. Furthermore, vicious circle approaches commonly see environmental 
problems in terms of physical availability or scarcity of natural resources. But it is possible for there 
to be environmental problems for certain people or groups despite a relative abundance of natural 
resources. The critical issues therefore relate to access and control over these resources. (Mearns, 
1996: 109-110)  
CBNRM is often linked with „vicious circle‟ theories and it has become increasingly used in rural 
development and natural resource management projects. The dominant narratives of CBNRM are 
linked to a number of assumptions. Firstly there is a belief, that there are distinct „homogenous‟ 
communities in which the common characteristics of their inhabitants clearly separate them from 
„outsiders‟. The assumption is that a short period of discussion and facilitation by the external 
agency will result in consensus and solidarity within the community regarding the means of 
intervention. While there may be much valid evidence of socially coherent communities that have 
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traditional social structures promoting equity and consensus, this is certainly not always the case. 
(Leach et al, 1999)  
The second assumption is that the natural environment is essentially stable - if it is subjected to 
disturbances that degrade natural resources then it can be restored to its natural equilibrium state. 
The idea is that these restoration efforts can be carried out by the local community in combination 
with varying degrees of outside intervention. This stems from the belief that there is a harmonious 
balance between community livelihoods and the natural resources that sustain them although they 
can be disrupted by external forces. These disruptions often have neo-Malthusian connotations, 
such as the example mentioned earlier of population growth as the main trigger for vicious circles 
of poverty and resource degradation. (Leach et al, 1999)    
These assumptions and narratives can be traced to earlier social and ecological theories especially 
perspectives originating from structural-functionalist theories. The view is that the structure of 
society, such as institutions of traditional authority, creates rules that govern people‟s behaviour, 
keeps social order intact, and maintains a steady equilibrium. Disruptions to this steady-state are the 
result of external factors which cause the breakdown of the system. Other theories claim that these 
functionally integrated societies are also functionally integrated with their environment. Similar 
thoughts stem from ecological theories that view the environment as subject to gradual linear 
change such as the successive stages from grass- to forestland, where forestland is the climax stage 
as close to the natural vegetation as possible and where grassland is the result of degradation from a 
once forested state. (Leach et al, 1999) 
A number of challenges to these theories have recently been presented and formulated. Actor-
oriented approaches, such as the one described above that accentuate the importance of human 
action and agency pose the most significant of these challenges to conventional theories. These 
approaches espouse the view that social heterogeneity and conflicting values is a main characteristic 
of communities. Similarly, „new ecologists‟ see the environment as being highly variable both in 
space and time and that the scale of analysis is crucial for conducting a proper analysis (Leach et al, 
1999). These newer social and ecological theories also place a great deal of importance on historical 
processes and how they shape the current social institutions as well as the environment. 
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2.2.1. Endowments and entitlements 
The point of departure for the environmental entitlements framework is that both the environment 
and the communities who utilise resources from it should be viewed as dynamic entities consisting 
of active individuals, groups, and components. Entitlements analysis can be used to uncover how 
changes in both the social and natural environment have a differential effect on those who use the 
resources present in the environment. In the context of this report the focus is placed on the social 
environment and the actors involved.  
In the framework developed by Leach et al, a set of environmental goods and services can be 
identified which different actors have varying degrees of access to. Environmental goods refers to 
the material and energy natural resource inputs that are essential to sustaining the livelihoods of 
present and future generations while services refer to service functions of the environment 
(including pollution absorption and the hydrological cycle) that are also essential to sustaining 
livelihoods (Leach et al, 1999: 243). The concept of endowments then signifies “the rights and 
resources that social actors have” (for example labour, land, skills) that can be employed to utilise 
or transform these goods and services into environmental entitlements (Leach et al, 1999: 233). 
Endowments can also be divided into different concepts of capital (described in the next chapter). 
The conventional definition of entitlements is the “alternative sets of utilities derived from 
environmental goods and services over which social actors have legitimate effective command and 
which are instrumental in achieving well-being” (Leach et al, 1999: 233); they encompasses “the 
ability to make effective use of resources”. This emphasises that management of resources is 
necessary in order to secure a livelihood. Management in this context also refers to the conditions 
that enable and constrain the ways people use their local environment, which are partly created by 
institutional arrangements (Mearns, 1996: 111).  
Entitlements can for example be food or water, the market value of these resources or the value of 
environmental services. The entitlements thus enhance actors‟ “capabilities”, which signifies “what 
people can do or be with their entitlements” (Leach et al, 1999: 233) and can be instrumental in 
improving livelihoods since these capabilities constitute a strengthening of the actors‟ agency. They 
also mediate the effects of poverty on the use and management of natural resources, and in turn 
mediate the ways in which environmental degradation contributes to poverty (Mearns, 1996: 111). 
There are no rigid classifications of what an environmental good or service can be and what is an 
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endowment at one point in time for one actor may be en entitlement at another point in time or to 
another actor (Leach et al 1999: 233).  
Entitlement mapping shows the linkages between environmental goods and services, endowments, 
entitlements, and the capabilities of the actors involved (see figure 1). At each stage of 
transformation institutions mediate the process and create enabling and constraining circumstances 
for different actors.  
 
Figure 1: Entitlements mapping, taken from Leach et al, 1999. 
 
2.2.2. Focusing on institutions 
Though natural resources and biophysical yields are most often designated as the limiting factors of 
development in rural areas, the true, scarce resource may be institutions. Without changing any 
other factors a change in the configuration of institutions can significantly influence the distribution 
of benefits among different actors that use the resources in question both within the community and 
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within the household. Institutions also play a pivotal role in the sustainable management of natural 
resources. (Mearns, 1996) 
When taking institutions and institutional processes into account, the definition of entitlements can 
be extended to signify “the outcome of negotiations among social actors, involving power 
relationships and debates over meaning” (C. Gore, 1993 cited by Leach et al, 1999: 235). 
Institutions are in this context seen not as organisations, agencies, banks or extension stations but 
rather as regularized patterns of behaviour that are the result of underlying structures and sets of 
rules which may then shape and define the practices of individuals, organisations, etc. Regularized 
practices, performed over time, come to constitute institutions. However, due to the consequences 
of past behaviour and actions institutional change may be induced. This is because these 
consequences can cause actors to behave in unforeseen, irregular ways. While formal institutions 
such as government policies and legal frameworks may change quickly, informal institutions 
change slowly (Leach et al, 1999: 238). There is often this discontinuity between the effects of 
informal versus formal institutions when it comes to access to resources. Institutions can thus also 
influence the endowment-entitlement transformation process at different levels ranging from the 
household to international macro-economic policies (Leach et al, 1999: 235). In this report the focus 
is on institutions ranging from the national level (government policies and legislation) to the local 
level (local authorities, household decision-making) where farmers seek to achieve sustainable 
livelihoods  
2.3. Sustainable rural livelihoods framework 
„Sustainable livelihoods‟ has been emphasized as a central concept in joint poverty reduction and 
environmental management contexts. Ian Scoones from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
has developed a framework for investigating the resources and strategies that are used and the 
processes that are important when attempting to achieve sustainable livelihoods (Scoones, 1998). 
Similar to entitlements analysis the framework stresses the role of institutions in mediating these 
processes. 
The framework is a tool for investigating which „livelihood resources‟ (different concepts of capital 
endowments) enable a certain combination of „livelihood strategies‟ that result in certain outcomes 
(achievement of sustainable livelihoods). The institutional processes mediate the ability of social 
actors to carry out these strategies and achieve or not achieve these outcomes.  
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2.3.1. Sustainable livelihoods  
The central concept of sustainable livelihoods will be used according to the definition proposed by 
Scoones which, though similar to Long‟s definition above, adds a dimension of sustainability: 
“A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and 
activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and 
recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not 
undermining the natural resource base” (Scoones, 1998: 5). 
Scoones divides sustainable livelihoods into five subcomponents: three elements that describe 
livelihoods and two elements that focus on aspect of sustainability.  
The elements that determine a livelihood are the creation of working days, poverty reduction and 
well-being and capabilities. Firstly, a sufficient number of working days per year (200 is the usual 
standard) should be created through the livelihood strategies that are pursued and Scoones quotes 
Sen in identifying three aspects of gainful employment income that are important: income (wages), 
production (an output that is consumable is generated), and recognition (the worker is recognized 
for being engaged in something worthwhile) (Sen, 1975, cited by Scoones, 1998: 5). The level of 
poverty is central when assessing livelihoods. The focus could be on absolute poverty (based on 
income and international donor agency standards) or relative poverty and inequality using the Gini 
coefficient. Lastly, well-being and capabilities refer to how actors are able to utilise their 
entitlements, as defined in the previous chapter. (Scoones, 1998) 
The first element that centres upon sustainability is livelihood adaptation, vulnerability and 
resilience, which refers to the ability of a livelihood to cope with and recover from stresses and 
shocks. This includes paying attention to historical experiences with coping and adaptation to 
shocks and stresses as well as the different responses these produce (for example tolerance or 
avoidance mechanisms).  The second element is natural resource base sustainability, which entails 
whether or not a system is able to maintain productivity when subjected to disturbing forces 
(stresses or shocks). Stocks of natural resources should thus not be depleted to a level where useful 
products and services no longer can be generated for livelihoods. (Scoones, 1998)  
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2.3.2. Livelihood resources and livelihood strategies 
The possession of tangible and intangible assets is crucial when pursuing different livelihoods. 
Scoones divides these assets into four different concepts of capital (natural, economic/financial, 
human and social capital), which he describes as livelihood resources that constitute the capital base 
from which livelihoods are constructed, though he acknowledges that many more forms of capital 
may exist. He defines them as follows: 
Natural capital: the stocks of natural resources (i.e. water, air, soil, etc.) and environmental services 
which are useful to livelihoods. 
Economic or financial capital: the capital base (cash, savings, credit and debt, production 
technologies, infrastructure) essential to livelihoods. 
Human capital: skills, knowledge, health, physical capability necessary for pursuing livelihoods. 
Social capital: social resources such as networks, social claims, relations, associations and 
affiliations that actors can draw upon in the pursuit of livelihoods. 
Actors combine the capital endowments they have access to in order to create livelihoods. The 
pursuit of different livelihood strategies can thus be analysed according to these concepts of capital. 
As examples one could investigate which forms of capital often are clustered together, differential 
access to capital forms, and the outcomes of this differential access. 
Scoones identifies three broad categories of livelihood strategies, which are pursued, according to 
which livelihood resources are available. These categories are: agricultural 
intensification/extensification, livelihood diversification, and migration. A farmer may want to 
focus on agriculture and choose to increase agricultural production through either intensification 
(more output per area through capital and labour investments) or extensification (more land taken 
under cultivation) depending on his control and access to livelihood resources. He may also choose 
to diversify and engage in off-farm economic activities or seek a livelihood in another place, either 
temporarily or permanently through migration.   
Agricultural intensification can be either capital-led (driven by policy and external inputs) or 
labour-led (where the farmers own labour and social resources are central). Diversification may be 
chosen in order to accumulate and re-invest or it may be a strategy chosen to cope with times of 
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adversity. If more streamlined strategies are failing, diversification may indeed be a permanent 
choice. These different strategies are often combined, depending on the resources that are accessible 
and can be controlled, in the creation of livelihoods. 
2.3.3. The role of institutions  
The framework also emphasizes the role of institutions, as defined in the previous chapter, in 
mediating the processes involved in achieving sustainable livelihoods. As mentioned above, these 
institutions are both formal and informal and are often ambiguous, allowing multiple interpretations 
by different actors. The dynamic aspect of institutions is also stressed; they are continually shaped 
and reshaped over time. (Scoones, 1998) 
Institutional analysis can therefore identify the enabling and constraining factors that affect the 
achievement of sustainable livelihoods. Such an analysis describes the underlying social processes 
involved and accentuates that they are characterised by negotiation and accommodation through the 
involvement of different actors and not distinguished by determinism.  The role that organisations 
play is also an important part of the analysis, given that they are “the players” where institutions are 
the “rules of the game”. (Scoones, 1998) 
The framework and its different components can be placed in a figure that shows how they are 
interconnected (see figure 2). This diagram is useful in an analysis or when planning an 
intervention. Scoones accentuates the complexity involved in undertaking such an investigation. It 
would be more or less impossible to include all elements in an analysis of a rural development 
intervention and the challenge is to identify what is most relevant in the given context. 
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Figure 2: Sustainable rural livelihoods framework 
Scoones, 1998 
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3. Methodology 
The following sections describe the methodological approach for analysis and the methods that 
were used during the field work conducted in the Phu Yen district, Son La province in North 
Western Vietnam. 
3.1. A fusion of theoretical frameworks 
The methodological approach for the analysis will take its point of departure in a fusion of the three 
theoretical frameworks described in the previous chapter. In other words, central elements from an 
actor-oriented approach, the extended entitlements analysis, and the sustainable rural livelihoods 
framework will be used to analyse the effects of planned intervention on ethnic minority farmers in 
Northern and North-Central Vietnam.  
The analysis examines situations where different social domains are involved in a process of 
accommodation or struggle in a social field. The focus will thus be on how capital endowments are 
employed by actors to transform environmental goods and services into entitlements that can 
enhance their capabilities and assets as well as ensure that stresses and shocks are coped with. In 
other words, this means that sustainable livelihoods are secured. Furthermore the analysis will seek 
to elucidate which institutions (both formal and informal) mediate and influence the outcomes of 
actors‟ struggles and negotiations. Institutional processes influence access to livelihood resources as 
well as livelihood strategies. Livelihood strategies and livelihood resources are also instrumental in 
generating capabilities necessary for ensuring sustainable livelihoods. For the purpose of the 
analysis a definition of “sustainable livelihoods” that combines the definitions by Long and Scoones 
will be used.   
The analysis will seek to use these concepts in the context of government and international NGO 
intervention and their effect on household decision-making. The main actor and central social 
domain in this case is the small-scale farming household and whether the pursuit of sustainable 
livelihoods for its members is achieved. 
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The following subchapter is a critical review of conventional views on planned intervention and 
how the methodology in this thesis serves as a counter-approach. 
3.2. The ‘multiple realities’ of planned intervention 
Many development projects and programmes, initiated by either international agencies or 
governments are similar with regard to the way the process of intervention is planned and carried 
out. Long discusses a number of these characteristics of planned intervention and raises some valid 
critiques (Long, 2001). He points out that intervention is often expected to follow a linear process: 
the policy agenda for the intervention is set, a problem is formulated, possible alternatives are 
found, policy is designed, it is implemented, and finally the results are evaluated. In other words it 
is assumed to be a clear step-by-step process which therefore makes a necessary change in policy 
during the implementation process difficult (Long, 2001). The logic of this linear process is 
exemplified by frameworks such as the Logical Framework Approach (LFA), which has been 
criticised, among other, for being overly simplistic and lacking a theoretical foundation. For 
example, the process of negotiation between stakeholders is present throughout each of the steps in 
the LFA which often means that there will be both intended and unintended consequences as a 
result of the intervention. Therefore the use of the LFA in monitoring and evaluation of 
interventions has also been deemed inappropriate since these unintended processes and effects often 
are ignored. Owing to the framework‟s origin as an intra-organisational tool it is not suited for inter-
organisational planned intervention where different stakeholders are forced to reach a consensus in 
too limited a time period. Another problem is the fact that many donors demand that an LFA be 
used for planned intervention projects, with the result that the LF is often made to accommodate an 
already pre-existing project design and not the other way round, which tends to create illogical LFs 
(Gasper, 2000: pp.21-23).  
Therefore a counter-approach to the LFA is one that stresses the range of actors involved, the 
shortage of predictive power, and the importance of unintended (beneficial or non-beneficial) 
effects (Gasper, 2000: p.21). However, the fact is that intervention is in most cases designed as 
temporally and spatially discrete projects where the actors involved are often rigidly defined and 
fall into either of two categories: target groups or intervening parties. This ignores the complex set 
of interrelationships and interactions between local actors (including some not identified as being 
part of a target group), state agencies, community-based organisations and other actors on-and off-
stage that can have a significant influence on livelihoods and access to resources. Another point that 
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Long raises is that when intervention is designed as discrete projects with well-defined temporal 
and spatial boundaries, relevant past experiences and learning (from intervening parties, target 
groups and other actors) may not be taken into account (Long, 2001: pp.30-33).  
Planned intervention, in a rural development setting, is often accompanied by definitions and 
narratives made by the intervening party that give the impression that the target group is the inferior 
„inside‟, whereas the intervening agency is the powerful „outside‟ or external force that can initiate 
development. This is often accomplished through the transfer of „packages‟ consisting of either 
tangible materials such as high yielding varieties of seeds and other inputs or less tangible assets 
such as transfers of knowledge and farming techniques. The former is often characteristic of 
government programs while the latter is increasingly used as a means of intervention by 
international or domestic NGOs. In both cases it is assumed that the packages include something 
that the target group lacks and which is crucial to starting a development process that can secure 
better livelihoods. The question is whether these packages enable the intended beneficiaries to gain 
access to resources that can generate entitlements and enhance capabilities much of which also 
depends on whether the intended effects of package intervention is compatible with local actors‟ 
perception and lifeworlds.  
Unfortunately, within this discourse there is in some cases an implicit belief that the existing social 
organisation and local lifeworlds are inappropriate or „backward‟. Local knowledge and resources 
are in these cases de-legitimized by the intervening agency. However, according to Long, it is often 
in situations where no external intervention takes place that local knowledge and practices are able 
to initiate a development process. When development is not able to proceed as a dynamic, 
autonomous process it is because it is being constrained by certain factors (including intervening 
agencies themselves in some cases). Partly following this logic the use of „participatory‟ methods 
and research such as PRA has now become standard practice for many international and national 
development organisations though it is debated whether or not these methods actually allow the 
most vulnerable members of a target group to be represented (Selender et al, 1999). The use of 
participatory methods is partly an acknowledgement that development can happen with the use of 
local knowledge and already present resources but the contention is often that „adequate‟ 
development must come from external intervention through the use of packages. (Long, 2001) 
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In order to ensure what is termed adequate development, intervening agencies in a rural 
development setting often choose specific actors who are considered most innovative and „receptive 
to change‟ as model farmers who can ensure the dissemination of the packages. These individuals 
often receive substantial benefits, i.e. coverage of labour costs, inputs, and seeds, in comparison 
with the rest of the target group (Long, 2001). This could in the long-term facilitate social inequity 
and further marginalise the poorest or most vulnerable that often form a large part of the target 
group. Certain actors (including organisations, local or otherwise) may be promoted in the 
intervention process while others may be constrained in their pursuit of livelihoods and interests. In 
these situations poor farming households with limited capital endowments are the ones who may 
lose out.  
Agricultural development involves complexity and a myriad of different actors that are both on- and 
offstage. Intervening in a rural setting therefore entails a careful study of the case-dependent local 
situations including all the different values, interpretations, actions attributed to the agency of the 
different actors. Using the approach formulated by Long therefore signifies that social heterogeneity 
is a main characteristic of agricultural development and that there are „multiple realities‟ or different 
lifeworlds involved in social interfaces where differing social worlds may clash. Therefore both 
when planning intervention or when evaluating an intervention, the latter being the case in this 
thesis, it is necessary to take into account the ways in which actors negotiate, struggle and 
accommodate to each others lifeworlds. It is also necessary to identify which social domains are 
involved, which interpersonal relationships and networks exist between and among actors, which 
actors succeed or fail in the process, and lastly who may benefit and who may be constrained from 
the intervention at hand.  
3.3. Field methods 
Empirical data was collected during the author‟s tenure as an intern for CARE in Vietnam. The data 
is central to the analysis of the means of intervention used by international NGOs in upland areas of 
Northern Vietnam.  
The internship lasted from the beginning of February to the beginning of June 2006 and was carried 
out in villages and communes of Phu Yen district in the North-western province Son La, which 
borders Laos (a map of Son La is included in Appendix 1).  During this period field visits were 
made every three weeks while the remainder of the time was spent transferring and analysing data, 
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and writing the report for CARE. The total duration of field work activities was a little over a 
month.  
The main tasks carried out during the internship was an evaluation of the sustainability of Sloping 
Agricultural Land Techniques (SALT) which were disseminated to farmers in Phu Yen as part of 
the Community Organisation Strengthening (COS) CARE project. The capacity of project-created 
community-based organisations, called Village Development Boards, to represent farming 
households was also investigated. The next sections describe which methods were used during the 
internship field work and offer some insights to their advantages and disadvantages. 
3.3.1. Sampling strategy 
The communes selected for structured and semi-structured interviews were chosen according to the 
time of implementation of SALT-activities. Three communes in Phu Yen district were selected: Tan 
Lang, Tuong Ha and Tuong Phong. In each of these, SALT-models had been implemented at 
different stages in 2005 and 2006.  
In each of the communes 2 villages were chosen for interviews using a questionnaire, resulting in a 
total of 57 respondents. In Tan Lang commune, the villages Yen Thinh and Mo were chosen in 
which SALT models were implemented in March and June, respectively. In Tuong Ha commune 
the villages Khoa 1 and Coc 3 were chosen in which SALT models were implemented in September 
to October 2005. Finally, in Tuong Phong commune, Ha Luong and Vam villages were chosen in 
which SALT models were implemented in December 2005 and January 2006, respectively.  
Three to four informal interviews per village were conducted in Xanh Vang village in Tuong 
Phong, in Coc 1 village in Tuong Ha, and in Ca village in Tan Lang. In Tan Lang, nine supported 
(model farmers) and ten non-supported farmers were interviewed; in Tuong Ha, ten supported and 
ten non-supported farmers were interviewed; and in Tuong Phong, ten supported farmers and eight 
non-supported farmers were interviewed using the questionnaire. In addition, 3-5 households in Mo, 
Coc 1, Ha Luong, and Ca villages were randomly selected as case-studies for in-depth semi-
structured interviews.  
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3.3.2. Questionnaires 
The major advantage of using a questionnaire is that it is cost- and time saving and a substantial 
amount of data from a large number of respondents can be generated. The questionnaire was thus 
chosen as a field method for this reason, because the collected data had to be representative, and 
because extended answers were not necessary for most of the required information. 
The questionnaire respondent was in each case the head of the household. Two questionnaires were 
designed: One for supported farmers and one for non-supported farmers. The two questionnaires 
contain some identical questions, for example regarding household economics, but differ with 
regards to inquiries about SALT practices. Three extension workers from the Agricultural 
Extension Station (AES), one attached to each of the three communes, carried out the interviews 
after being trained by COS staff and the author. The extension workers had visited the study 
villages many times previously and were aware of the problems and needs of the villagers. 
Furthermore many of the extension workers are themselves members of an ethnic minority and thus 
have firsthand knowledge of the culture and languages of both Thai and Muong villagers. These 
factors contribute to a larger degree of reliability in the responses than had the intern carried out the 
interviews single-handedly.  
Most questions in the questionnaire were closed-ended. The advantage of this is that the set of 
alternative responses are uniform and easily allows for a comparison between respondents. This 
also makes it easy to transfer responses directly to a computer for data analysis. Having a fixed list 
of answers to choose from also makes the intent of the question clearer for the respondent and thus 
limits the chance of irrelevant responses. Sensitive issues can in some cases be easier to address 
through a list of fixed alternatives as opposed to an open-ended question where the respondent is 
asked to describe, in specific terms, something that might be of a highly personal nature (Rea and 
Parker, 1997: 32-33). However a few open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire 
where it was considered necessary. 
One disadvantage to using closed-ended questions is that the respondent may choose an answer 
randomly in case the person is unsure of the best answer or misunderstands the question. Closed-
ended questions also tend to narrow the subject matter and prevent respondents from answering to 
the fullest extent possible, though there are ways to mitigate this effect. After conducting a pre-test 
of the questionnaire it was found useful to include open-ended answer categories such as „other‟ 
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and „if yes, please explain‟, giving the respondent the option to state his or her own answer without 
using the pre-designated alternatives (other) and to elaborate on an answer if needed (if yes, please 
explain). This represented a useful compromise between using only open-ended or closed-ended 
questions (Rea and Parker, 1997: 34).  
3.3.3. Interviews 
Both loosely- and semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to obtain in-depth 
information about some of the issues included in the questionnaire. Questionnaire data can often be 
thin or slightly superficial and semi-structured interviews tend to generate more detailed answers. 
Questions are rarely misunderstood and it is easier to obtain extended responses through the use of 
prompts and probes (Gilham, 2000: pp 9-11). The questions asked were all open-ended and in some 
cases sensitive in nature. This is another reason that the semi-structured interview was chosen as the 
appropriate method since it is easier to establish a sense of trust with the respondent in comparison 
with a standardized questionnaire. One disadvantage of using semi-structured interviews is the 
time-consuming nature of the process, which can be balanced by the fact that unintended new 
discoveries can be made. The semi-structured interview is well-suited for case-studies but not for 
collecting larger-scale, representative data.  
On the first field visit informal interviews with model farming households and non-supported 
households were conducted. The information collected in these interviews allowed for the 
elaboration of more structured interviews which were conducted during the second and third field 
visits, also with both supported and non-supported households. In most cases, but not all cases, the 
male head of the household was interviewed. The topics discussed were mainly the benefits of 
SALT, soil conservation measures used in the past, the current land tenure situation, and future 
household and community needs. Central actors including representatives from the AES, the VBSP, 
the Forest Protection Department (FPD), and members of Village Development Boards (VDBs) 
were also interviewed as key informants (see interview guide in Appendix 3).  
3.3.4. Observations 
Notes and observations were made when visiting study villages and during interviews. Notes were 
also taken during attendance at Village Development Planning (VDP) sessions in villages in Tuong 
Ha commune. The VDP were PRA sessions where villagers identified current difficulties and future 
needs relating to all aspects of village livelihoods. The main method used during these sessions was 
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participatory social mapping exercises done with different groups i.e. men, women, poor 
households, using local materials. 
3.3.5. Desk study 
In addition to the field work and data collection, a desk study was conducted in the CARE office in 
Hanoi. Literature concerning upland agriculture, land tenure policies, Vietnamese credit and loan 
institutions, and the agricultural extension system in Vietnam, in addition to project and program 
documents was collected and used to complement the field work and to produce the report for 
CARE in Vietnam. The majority of these sources were also used in the analysis and discussion for 
this thesis. 
3.4. Using the methodological approach and methods 
The central analysis in the next chapter is divided into two parts:  
1) An overview of notable government programs and projects; a critique of the policy formulation 
process; and an analysis of the effects of government policies and programmes on household 
decision-making and the creation of sustainable livelihoods. The case studies used all deal with 
ethnic minority communities. This section relies mainly on articles written by other authors.  
2) An analysis of the operational space of international NGOs as they struggle with and 
accommodate to both the Vietnamese State and the interests of the local target groups; and a 
discussion of the means of intervention used by international NGOs in rural development projects in 
Northern and North Central Vietnam. The analysis draws upon data collected during the field work 
and is supported by similar studies conducted by other authors.  
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4. Analysis and discussion 
4.1. Government policies and sustainable livelihoods 
As mentioned above, mountainous areas have increasingly been incorporated in Vietnam‟s 
development strategies, and are gradually being integrated in the process of national modernisation 
and industrialisation (Binh, 1998). The central government in Vietnam considers mobilisation of the 
vast stocks of natural resources in highland provinces as being integral for future economic 
development. This has prompted the issuance of numerous policies and programs concerned with 
development in mountainous regions from the early to mid-1990s (Binh, 1998: 5). Some of the 
most notable of these include the Land Allocation Program, the National Program on Restoration of 
Barren Lands and Denuded Hills (known as Program 327), the Agriculture and Forestry Extension 
Policy, and the 5 million Hectare Reforestation Program (known as Program 661). In addition, large 
scale infrastructure projects, focusing on land development and water use, have been carried out in 
mountainous areas as part of the government‟s development policies. The scope of government 
programs varies with regards to both activities and geographical target areas. Program 327 is being 
implemented in all mountainous provinces in Vietnam and involves a wide range of activities 
related to resettlement, sedentarisation, and community development (Sikor, 1995; cited by Binh, 
1998). The Land Allocation Program aims to allocate both agricultural and forestry land to 
individual households in every part of the country (Binh, 1998: 5). To support these programs, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has created a hierarchy of extension departments 
and stations, offering support for agricultural and forestry activities. Developed in 1993, Vietnam‟s 
agricultural extension system encompasses provincial level extension centres to district-, commune- 
and village-level extension stations currently in 70% of all districts in Vietnam.  
4.1.1. Overview of government policies related to upland areas 
It has been suggested that policy makers and government institutions have continuously maintained 
a critical view of the swidden
1
 cultivators - primarily ethnic minorities - that live and have lived in 
upland areas for hundreds of years; a view that is suggested to date back to the French colonial 
period in the late 1800s (Leisz, 2006). Ethnic minorities are often perceived as „backward‟ people 
                                                 
1
 The term swidden, also known as „slash and burn‟, is used to describe cultivation systems in which land is cleared of 
vegetation, burned, and cultivated for one to three or four years, then left fallow for a number of years before being 
cultivated again (Leisz, 2006).  
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who maintain primitive production systems. Furthermore, the environmental implication is that 
swidden cultivation destroys forests and causes land degradation, soil erosion, and downstream 
flooding.  Indeed, this view is often substantiated in the laws and policies passed by the government 
since the country‟s independence (Leisz, 2006). While these orthodox views constitute the 
lifeworlds of government officials and institutions at higher levels, the lifeworlds of swidden 
cultivators and other local actors often differ from and conflict with these views. This has important 
implications for the outcome of government intervention. 
In addition to the orthodox views that are the foundation of government lifeworlds, other related 
issues can be linked to the ways policies are formed. The formulation of policies in Vietnam has 
been criticised for being highly technology-based, characterised by a top-down approach, and 
failing to incorporate local resources and livelihoods, such as swidden cultivation (Binh, 1998: 8). 
For example, the agriculture and forestry extension system is driven by the notion that more 
advanced techniques should be disseminated to and used by farmers; techniques which often 
involve high input systems including hybrid crops and fast-growing pigs (Binh, 1998: 9) which are 
culturally far removed from the lifeworlds of ethnic minority communities. A technology-based 
approach is characterised by straightforward and simple solutions. This is often favoured by policy-
makers due to the complexities of upland areas, which are characterised by uncertain and changing 
physical and social environments (Binh, 1998). Unfortunately, the formulation process omits 
thorough research of household decision-making and livelihood strategies as well as an 
investigation of existing local informal institutions that have enabled communities to cope with a 
complex, changing environment. This greatly increases the potential for unintended effects of 
intervention.  
Being based on a „technology‟ approach, Program 327 has met with frequent failures and poor 
results (Binh, 1998: 9). It has been documented that farmers involved in the project were forced to 
plant trees on agricultural land, causing them to lose income. This produced a clear response from 
households, who after some time, cut down the trees in order to reclaim agricultural land (CARE, 
2004a: 8). Another government initiative that has been criticised is the implementation of the Land 
Allocation Program. The program is part of Vietnam‟s reformation of land tenure regulations. 
These reforms have occurred in many developing countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s, often 
promoted by international aid organisations and the World Bank (Leisz, 2006). The Vietnamese 
government has based its new land regulations on theories that link privatisation of land use rights 
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with increased tenure security and have stated that the regulations serve a dual purpose of increased 
agricultural productivity and food security as well as improved conservation of natural resources 
(Leisz, 2006). Under the Land Allocation Program rural households were granted renewable land 
use rights certificates called Red Books. These certificates allow rights to use land for annual crops 
for 20 years and rights to use forestry land
2
 and land for perennial crops for 50 years. Ethnic 
minorities in the uplands were among the last to receive these certificates, as preference was given 
to urban centres and the main lowland rice-growing areas in the first five years of implementation. 
In mountainous provinces such as Son La, preferences in issuance of certificates were also given to 
valley areas at the expense of upland areas (Neef, 1999). The linkages between privatisation of land 
use rights, tenure security, food security, and environmental protection is a highly researched and 
debated issue (Platteau, 2001 cited by Leisz, 2006; Thanh & Sikor, 2006a; Sikor and Thanh, 
2006b). Although a thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, the underlying 
institutional complexities of land allocation in local communities will be examined later in this 
section.  
The large-scale land development and water use programs - implemented mainly through foreign 
investment - have often had high environmental and social costs, especially for local populations in 
remote areas (Binh, 1998). The Hoa Binh hydroelectric dam, located in the mountainous province 
of Hoa Binh, is a striking example. As part of its construction, The Da river in North-western 
Vietnam was dammed in order to create a reservoir. After the dam went into operation in 1988, the 
reservoir was flooded incurring heavy environmental and social costs on local people in the region. 
Initially the dam forced the relocation of 9,305 households – totalling 52,000 people – mostly 
members of the Muong ethnic group that subsequently resettled on steep slopes above the River 
(Rambo and Vien, 2001). A decade after, more than ten thousand farmers of Muong and Tày 
ethnicity were still suffering from the loss of their land (Binh, 1998), and the cultivation of steep 
slopes is a major cause of sedimentation in the Da river (Rambo and Vien, 2001). The government-
established Program 747 was designed to help local communities overcome the effects of in-
migration as a result of the dam‟s construction. However, not all affected communities were 
included in the program‟s activities. Construction of the Hoa Binh dam is an example of the 
                                                 
2
 There are three kinds of forestry land allocated in Vietnam: Productive forestry, protection forestry and special use 
forestry. Productive forestry land is for planting of fruit trees and timber species which can be sold, protection forestry 
is for natural regeneration purposes, while special use forestry is for biodiversity conservation including National Parks 
and Nature conservation areas. The latter is managed by a special forestry board, which is independent of the FPD 
(interview, FPD). 
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government‟s top-down approach to policy-making which involves a lack of public consultation, 
information disclosure, and failure to cooperate with local people in the mountainous regions of 
Vietnam (Binh, 1998).  
The following analysis will focus on how the policies and programs mentioned above affect 
household decision-making and how this decision-making influences natural resource management 
and the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods. In this context achieving sustainable livelihoods entails 
whether these government policies enable or constrain households in generating capabilities derived 
from the entitlements they have. It is also central to this investigation whether or not institutions 
exist - be they informal social institutions or formal governmental structures - that can mediate the 
process of generating endowments into entitlements, and entitlements into capabilities, which are 
necessary for achieving sustainable livelihoods.  
Differential impacts on household decision-making often arise, among other factors, as a result of 
the frequency of intervention and the history of social organisation in the specific location. Three 
case studies are presented – all of which focus on ethnic minority villages and hamlets - where 
swiddening is practiced as part of the household farming system: The Da Bac Tay in Hoa Binh 
province; the Dao, Nung, and Tày in Bac Kan province; and the Black Thai in Nghe An and Son La 
provinces. As indicated above, the practice of swiddening poses a potential discrepancy between 
government policy and the cultural traditions and livelihoods of these communities. 
4.1.2. Case study 1: Tat hamlet  
A number of studies related to natural resource management and social organisation have been 
conducted in Tat hamlet
3
 (Rambo and Vien, 2001; Vien, 2003; Vien, 2004). The hamlet is located 
in Da Bac district of Hoa Binh province in Northwestern Vietnam. Villagers in Tat are 
predominantly of the Da Bac Tày minority, a subgroup of the largest Vietnamese minority, the Tày. 
The Da Bac Tày, however, are culturally and linguistically distinct from the main body of Tày 
(Rambo and Vien, 2001: 302).   
While most Tày traditionally practice lowland rice farming, the Da Bac Tày use „composite 
swiddening‟, a unique type of agroecosystem that integrates permanent wet-rice fields on the valley 
                                                 
3
 The lowest level of government administration is the commune. In upland areas, there are often several hamlets or 
villages within a single commune (Leisz, 2006). For the purpose of this thesis there will not be distinguished between 
„village‟ and „hamlet‟ as human settlements and both terms are used. 
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floor and rotating swidden plots on hill-slopes into a single household system of resource 
management (Castella et al, 2005; Vien, 2003). When the hamlet was founded many years ago there 
was abundant land in the valley floor for paddy rice cultivation, yet villagers chose to use this 
unique composite farming system, incorporating both upland and lowland farming. Composite 
swiddening is a relatively stable adaptation that has persisted for generations in the mountain and 
valley zones of the highlands of Northern Vietnam including Tat hamlet. Ancestors of Tat villagers 
have most likely practiced composite swiddening for centuries (Vien, 2003, Rambo and Vien, 
2001). In contrast to more pure forms of swiddening, which can induce rapid degradation or 
collapse in the face of increasing population pressure, composite swiddening is a relatively robust 
farming system. It has also been shown not to cause severe deforestation and to have much lower 
rates of soil loss than pure swiddening systems (Vien et al, 2006). It offers possibilities for 
intensification and has been shown to generate a high level of equitability among household 
incomes (Vien, 2003). Households in Tat hamlet today manage a complex agroecosystems, 
including subsystems such as wet rice fields, home gardens, fish ponds, livestock raising, tree 
gardens, and rice, cassava, maize, ginger and canna swiddens. However, swiddening is an essential 
and central component of the system with swidden rice being the most important crop for 
households. Swiddening is thus not a primitive and disappearing feature of the farming system, nor 
is it a response to lack of paddy land in the valley (Rambo and Vien, 2001; Vien, 2003; Vien, 
2004).  
4.1.2.1. History of social organisation and land use in Tat hamlet 
The current land use and natural resource management is heavily influenced by the hamlet‟s history 
of social organisation. The agency and „lifeworlds‟ of the central actors in this context - the average 
farming households - are mainly composed of and influenced by villagers‟ experience with external 
forces. Rambo and Vien (2001) identify three historical periods of social organisation in the hamlet: 
The feudal period, the cooperative period, and the current period where government policies of 
forestland allocation, issuance of agricultural land certificates, taxation of land, and infrastructure 
development have been implemented (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 306). In this chapter two periods are 
highlighted in each of which social organisation was determined by an external force which has 
affected the building of informal social institutions in Tat hamlet. This has had repercussions for the 
pursuit of sustainable livelihoods.  
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During the feudal period, lasting from 1885 to 1945 Tat hamlet was part of the French protectorate 
Tonkin. Due to military resistance to the French occupation in the mountainous areas of 
Northwestern Vietnam, an indirect rule system was imposed in Tat hamlet which relied on powerful 
local chiefs, often of Muong or Thai ethnicity. Until the end of the colonial period Tat hamlet, as a 
tributary unit in a larger social formation, was ruled by Muong overlords in a complex hierarchical 
system. This feudal regime was mainly concerned with extracting labour from the hamlet and 
villagers were forced to endure hard labour without being offered any real services in return. 
Exploitation of natural resources by villagers, however, was not regulated and they were free to fell 
large timber for house-construction. Land management was left entirely to households and whoever 
first claimed a wet-rice field held permanent rights to it, which was acknowledged by the remaining 
households. Households could freely clear swiddens in the abundant forest though crops had to be 
planted in order to claim rights to an upland area and no special rights were accorded when the field 
was left fallow. Wild plants and animals could also be collected freely in the forest. The lack of 
interest from the colonial power and other outsiders in exploiting village resources (mainly due to 
the remoteness of the area) combined with a low population density left no need for any regulatory 
institutions regarding land use. (Rambo and Vien, 2001) 
During the war of resistance against the French (1947-1954), villagers in Tat hamlet chose to side 
with the Viet Minh, after enduring harsh treatment during the feudal period. All of Da Ba district 
became a resistance base area, and the Viet Minh organised a guerrilla force in Tat hamlet. 
Villagers suffered immensely during this period, including enduring acts of retaliation by French 
soldiers. Due to widespread hunger theft of rice became a common problem which led to villagers 
storing rice in their homes instead of in granaries, a practice which continues to this day (Rambo 
and Vien, 2001). 
In 1959 the Vietnamese State decided to extend agricultural collectivization into the mountainous 
areas of the country (Tran, 1968 cited by Sikor, 2006). The cooperative period in the hamlet lasted 
from 1959 to the mid 1980s, during which all paddy fields, buffalo, cattle, and tools were 
collectivised. Harvest was divided among villagers according to the number of work points 
accumulated. Cheating to gain extra points was widespread among villagers, which had the effect of 
reducing the amount of food for some (Rambo and Vien, 2001). In contrast to other areas of 
Vietnam during the same period, notably the lowland communities of the Red River delta, no social 
institutions existed that could prevent cheating from happing (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 312).  
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At the same time, the lack of food security (lasting up to 6 months a year) made the forest a vital 
resource. In the beginning of the cooperative period the forest was still dense with many large trees 
and forest use remained unregulated. This continued until the late 1950s, where households cleared 
swiddens in the forest, keeping all the produce for their own consumption (Rambo and Vien, 2001). 
The State nationalized forests in 1955 and subjected them to direct State management. “Forestry 
land” included all land with a slope above 20 degrees (Sikor, 2006: 623; Sikor, 2002: 6-7). 
However, villagers subsequently continued unregulated use of the forest since no serious efforts 
were made to control it. Government intervention only increased unregulated exploitation of 
resources. In 1978 a program was implemented by local authorities, as part of the government‟s 
national reforestation policies, which allowed anyone to clear swiddens so long as they planted 
Styrax trees after harvesting their upland rice. Since the State would pay households a modest 
amount for this service, villagers began clearing more swiddens because they had the double benefit 
of a larger rice harvest and receiving payment from the government (Rambo and Vien, 2001).  
4.1.2.2. Summary and discussion 
The above historical outline makes it clear that history must have important implications for the 
way decision-making regarding natural resources that currently takes place in Tat hamlet. 
During the feudal period the social domain of the average farming household conflicted with the 
higher level domains in the hierarchy of the feudal system. In this social interface there were no 
internal institutions, or community domain, that enabled villagers to engage in new economic 
ventures, seize upon opportunities, or to maintain social order within the community. Despite the 
free exploitation of forest land and resources, villagers struggled to achieve sustainable livelihoods 
under the constraints of the feudal regime and their local overlord. Villagers‟ response to the actions 
of their superiors was to side with the Viet Minh during the resistance war period (1947-1954) after 
enduring lack of services, harsh treatment, and hard labour throughout the feudal period. 
During the cooperative period, a social arena existed in which some actors gained access to 
resources at the expense of others. This served to reinforce a lack of trust in the external force, in 
this case the cooperative. Internal social institutions were still more or less nonexistent, leaving the 
cooperative as the dominating institution and domain regarding not only management of hamlet 
resources, but also rules and norms for general conduct. Lack of informal social institutions meant 
that cheating to gain additional benefits was common since it was accepted or went unnoticed by 
 32 
the cooperative. This had the effect of distancing households from each other and degrading the 
cohesiveness of the community. 
As in the days of feudal rule, the lack of social institutions during the cooperative period also 
affected the management of natural resources. The unregulated use of the forest continued and 
individual households were free to exploit resources at will since no rules existed to limit these 
activities. 
4.1.2.3. Current actors and natural resource management in Tat hamlet 
The agricultural reforms that followed the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 transformed rural 
institutions in Vietnam. Production shifted from a cooperative to a household-based system and 
market pricing replaced rice equivalents as measures of output (Sikor and O‟Rourke, 1996). In Tat 
hamlet the role of the cooperative in natural resource management was gradually replaced by the 
current household management unit. Collective labour was abandoned in favour of granting 
individual rights to paddy fields to households (Rambo and Vien, 2001). The main actors involved 
in the management of natural resources in the hamlet today are the cooperative, the local 
government, State agencies, and individual households.  
The cooperative retains responsibilities regarding the regulation of land use, land taxation and 
maintenance of social order. All households must belong to the cooperative in order to stay in the 
hamlet. The chairman of the cooperative is elected by its members and confirmed by the Village 
People‟s Committee (VPC). The cooperative chairman and the headman of the VPC share a number 
of responsibilities, the most important of which include overseeing the management of land under 
the cooperative and distributing payments to villagers for protecting forest land (under government 
Program 327). However, full payment to households is rare. One year there was only enough money 
for 16 households out of the 79 households involved in the program and the money was thus split 
among the 79 households. Conversely, the chairman of the cooperative is supposed to receive a 
payment of 50-60 kg of paddy per harvest from a fund made up of contributions from all villagers. 
One year the chairman had only been paid by 25 households out of a total of 91. The same situation 
exists for members of the VPC who are also supposed to receive a share of the rice harvest. 
However, most households do not contribute and the members are more or less unpaid volunteer 
workers. (Rambo and Vien, 2001) 
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Part of the land controlled by the cooperative is an area totalling 30 hectares reserved for swiddens. 
This area was originally divided into two tracts of land where one would be cultivated for 4 years 
while the other lay fallow. Villagers could freely pick a field on the tract, though they would not 
own any residual right to the field. However, population pressure caused this system to break down, 
and households currently maintain swiddens in both tracts of land, also retaining control over the 
land. The remaining land controlled by the cooperative is secondary forest where villagers are 
allowed to collect bamboo shoots and stems. Households that clear swiddens on that land could be 
subjected to modest fines and many households in need of land are willing to take the risk. Illegal 
cutting of swiddens and forest fires have been on the increase but both the cooperative leaders and 
the VPC feel unable to control the situation. According to them, it is due to the prevailing hunger 
among many households that forces them to break regulations (Rambo and Vien, 2001). 
State agencies, such as the Forest Protection Department (FPD), are officially involved in regulating 
land use in the hamlet. These regulations adhere to uniform national laws. Trees can be cut down in 
areas not classified as protected forest for the purposes of constructing a house or repairing it, but 
the timber is not to be sold. Permission has to be obtained from the VPC and a tax has to be paid. 
Though a forest protection cadre from the FPD has been assigned to oversee forest protection, the 
actual enforcement of regulations is the duty of the VPC and the cooperative, both of which lack the 
means to enforce them properly. Many young men are therefore involved in illegal logging partly 
because they do not fear any reprisals. (Rambo and Vien, 2001) 
Today, most forest land has been allocated to individual households, some dating back to the 
cooperative period. However, the allocation has been badly implemented among other things due to 
the fact that two different State agencies in the district, the Land office and the Forestry office, has 
been involved in carrying out the same task. First the Forestry office had allocated 100 ha of forest 
land to households, with an accompanying “Red Book” land certificate for each household, under 
the condition that the land not be used for clearing swiddens and felling timber. Later, the Land 
office issued Red Books to households for 100 ha of forestry land under Program 327, also to be 
protected. This land has since then frequently been cleared for swiddens. This may be due to the 
fact that the view of the local government differs from that of the Land office. The VPC hamlet 
headman claimed that two plots were allocated to each household, where one could be used for 
clearing swiddens. To further complicate things, the land allocated through each of the two State 
agencies often overlaps so that two different households may have Red Books for the same piece of 
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land. No proper map or land survey had been made during the implementation of Program 327, 
which made it difficult to settle disputes over land. When officials finally wanted to correct the 
situation and draw proper maps, households refused to hand over their Red Books fearing that they 
would lose their land. Some households even began rushing to fell trees on their land because of 
fears that their land would soon not be officially recognized. In general, many villagers still view 
protected forest land as being “open access”, making the task of protecting it very difficult (Rambo 
and Vien, 2001). 
On the national level, the Vietnamese State profits from villagers‟ use of natural resources through 
land and resource taxes. These taxes seemingly have the sole purpose of generating revenue for the 
State (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 317). Six kinds of taxes are collected in the hamlet, the most 
important being the “Mixed Gardens” tax and the “Agricultural Land” tax, in which the latter 
pertains only  to paddy land (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 318). According to the study, evasion of taxes 
is common, especially the “Mixed Gardens” tax. After the government prohibited swidden farming 
in Vietnam, the Da Bac Tay villagers in Hoa Binh province have had to find ways of concealing 
their swidden farming activities. They do this by using the “mixed gardens” land for swidden 
cultivation but continue to call the fields “mixed gardens”. Villagers have also strategically used the 
term “dry rice” instead of “swidden rice” when reporting to local authorities. In addition they make 
sure that there is preserved forest near the main roads where government officials can easily inspect 
conditions, but keep swiddening activities confined to more remote hill and mountain slopes. 
(Rambo and Vien, 2001)  
Despite the taxation and regulations on land use, public services have been provided by the State, 
including subsides for health clinics and schools. Large scale infrastructure projects, such as the 
building of the Hoa Binh dam and the upgrading of a road linking the hamlet to other areas of the 
district, have had direct and indirect effects on the hamlet. The building of the dam displaced 
thousands of households, mainly Muong and Tày families (Binh, 1998). This had an indirect effect 
on Tat hamlet since three Muong households moved to Tat, having been displaced, increasing the 
pressure on natural resources (Vien et al, 2006). The fact that a power line was built, running 
through the hamlet from the Hoa Binh generator, did not provide any benefits to either the majority 
of displaced households (Binh, 1998) nor to villagers in Tat hamlet since the cost of connecting to it 
were much too high. The upgraded road, however, did improve the accessibility of the hamlet and 
provided market access for villagers. Unfortunately this has resulted in greater exploitation of forest 
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resources due to the fact that many villagers are eager to obtain cash to buy food and consumer 
goods. Purchasing rice at the market is especially important during bad harvests in order to alleviate 
food insecurity (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 319-320). 
Another State initiative includes a number of tree-planting projects. The narrative behind this goes 
back to the early 1960s when Ho Chi Minh encouraged the planting of Melia trees in ethnic 
minority communities in mountainous areas of Vietnam. Villagers in Tat hamlet did this as well, 
though they did not see the reasoning behind it (Rambo & Vien, 2001: 319). Some households now 
practice a form of agro-forestry by planting Melia seeds together with crops in their swiddens. 
Burning the swidden stimulates growth of the Melia trees, which can generate several entitlements 
for households. Melia leaves can serve as a green manure to fertilize rice and can be used as an 
insecticide. Branches can be used for firewood and after 7-10 years the trees can harvested and sold 
at a relatively good price. Melia is thus the most important tree species grown in the hamlet, though 
some households also use Styrax trees for this purpose, acquired through the previously mentioned 
1978 reforestation program. Later efforts to plant candlenut and eucalyptus trees in Tat have mostly 
failed either due to lack of marketing or lack of soil suitability. Some households do still harvest 
eucalyptus trees and sell them to the State to be used in the pulp and timber industries (Vien, 2003). 
4.1.2.4. Summary and discussion 
Though the local government, in this case the VPC and the cooperative, maintain some power and 
authority for example in deciding who can reside in the village, households generally do not respect 
their status as authoritative institutions. Households often do not contribute payments of rice to the 
chairman of the cooperative or to members of the VPC, illegal logging takes place, and swiddens 
are cleared on protected forest land despite the threat of fines. Local government is, for the most 
part, responsible for implementing and enforcing national policies and programs in the hamlet. With 
few exceptions these have been badly implemented. The households that are involved in Program 
327 have not received their rightful payments for this activity, which is hard enough considering 
that many other villagers do not regard the land as being „protected‟ and will not hesitate to clear 
swiddens on the land.  
The local government institutions are often in a difficult position. As a social actor, the „lifeworld‟ 
of local government often conflicts with that of district and provincial officials who adhere much 
more rigidly to national laws and policies. Local authorities are often villagers themselves 
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illustrated by the fact that employment as a government cadre is a sideline occupation for 7% of 
households (Vien, 2004). Furthermore, the local government is sympathetic to villagers‟ situation, 
and are therefore faced with the dilemma of pleasing their superiors at the commune and district 
level as well as maintaining the interests of the local population. In addition, the remoteness of Tat 
hamlet may mean that district officials are not able to visit communes, much less hamlets, as often 
as they should in order to enforce regulations with their formal, legal power. This may be due to 
lack of funding in the district departments for transport and other resources. For example, while the 
district FPD is supposed to oversee the enforcement of forestry regulations, the actual task is carried 
out by the local government. The willingness of district officials to modify national laws and 
policies or at least give local governments more autonomous authority has been observed in other 
mountainous communities (Leisz, 2006; Sikor, 2006). In those cases, however, local informal 
institutions have existed alongside or overlapped with the local government and have maintained 
social order as well as more sustainable management of resources. 
The State taxation of land is often evaded by households and swidden farming is kept hidden from 
government officials. Swidden farming and upland rice, an activity maintained for generations, are 
central features of villagers‟ „lifeworlds‟ and livelihoods, making it very difficult for State officials 
to eliminate this practice. Although efforts have been made by villagers to find new suitable areas 
for paddy rice and to develop new swidden crops (canna, maize, ginger), having rice swiddens 
remains the most important activity (Vien, 2003: 197).  
While large scale government rural development projects, such as the upgrading of the road and the 
building of the hydroelectric dam, may be part of a well-intentioned goal of bridging the economic 
and cultural gap between highland and lowland communities, these initiatives have met with 
varying success. The upgrading of the road has given villagers market access and the composite 
farming system has changed as a result, for example with a larger variety of swidden crops being 
grown for selling at the market. At the same time market access has increased their dependency on 
consumer goods, putting pressure on natural resources. The cultural aspects of villagers‟ livelihoods 
and identities have also changed and villagers are starting to mimic the lifestyles of lowlanders. 
While these government initiatives seem to have had some of their intended effects, they have also 
had many unintended, and negative, effects. 
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The tree-planting programs that have reached Tat hamlet have largely been unsuccessful and few 
households have chosen to invest in tree gardens. Melia trees seem to show the most promise, as 
they are able to generate a number of entitlements for households.   
4.1.2.5. Household decision-making, entitlements, and institutions 
The history of social organisation and recent State intervention are the driving forces that have 
determined household decision-making in the hamlet. Decision-making authority and control over 
physical assets had been gradually transferred from the cooperative to communities and households 
as early as in 1981, preceding the official Sixth Party Congress reforms (Sikor and O‟Rourke, 1996; 
609). In Tat hamlet today, most decisions concerning natural resource management are made by 
individual households. The average household has changed from being essentially subsistence-
oriented to being increasingly engaged in the cash economy (Rambo and Vien, 2001; Vien, 2004). 
The dependency on purchasing rice has increased for households that used to be self-sufficient. The 
composite-swiddening system is still the most important cultural tradition that the Da Bac Tay 
residents have maintained. Swiddening, as mentioned before, remains an essential component of the 
farming system. At the same time, cultural perceptions in the lowlands have a significant influence 
on villagers in Tat hamlet and there currently exists a larger demand for motorbikes and televisions 
(Vien, 2004). Though almost all households now own a transistor radio, having the household 
reproduce itself is still the first priority while striving for upward social mobility and accumulation 
of capital for investments comes second (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 320; Vien, 2004).  
Households in Tat hamlet have modest endowments of natural capital. Land in Tat hamlet consists 
primarily of hill slopes and mountains and flat land is scarce. Bunded wet rice fields can only be 
created on a few hectares on the valley floor since 80% of the land has a slope of over 25 degrees, 
which according to government law would make it forestry land (Sikor, 2002; Sikor, 2006). While 
most of the hamlet territory was covered by primary forest until the 1960s, today only small patches 
exist on the most inaccessible and steep peaks. Most slopes are covered with swiddens or recently 
fallowed plot, and the valley bottom is covered with wet rice fields (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 301). 
Despite the fact that State law dictates that no new rice swiddens be cleared, Tat households 
continue to do so. However, many households have to continue to use the same swidden fields with 
shorter and shorter fallow periods. Soil quality on these fields has therefore declined and pests are 
also becoming a significant constraint on both paddy rice and swidden crop production (Vien, 
2004).  
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There is an almost exclusive reliance on household labour and skills in the hamlet. There is a clear 
sexual division and women have a significantly harder workload than men. Men clear and burn 
swiddens, prepare the land in paddy fields, uproot rice seedlings and help to carry them from the 
nurseries to the paddy field, weave baskets that are sold and used in the household, and illegal 
logging is only carried out by young men. Women are responsible not only for all the domestic 
tasks including cooking and cleaning. They also collect and market fruit, collect and cut firewood, 
and collect bamboo shoots and wild vegetables. Women also have the main responsibility for 
weeding, transplanting seedlings in the paddies, planting seed in the swiddens, harvesting the rice, 
as well as threshing (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 304-305).  
The sale of timber and Non-Timber-Forest-Products (NTFPs) is one of the most important 
entitlements for households and is the most important cash income source. It accounts for 27.6 % of 
household income, including what is derived from illegal logging (Vien, 2004). In addition to forest 
products, fruit and baskets are sold at the nearest markets, the closest being 12 km away (Rambo 
and Vien, 2001: 303). Melia trees, as mentioned before, generates a number of entitlements for 
households though only some families grow them in tree gardens, and most large families continue 
to rely on swiddening. Agricultural crops account for 22.1 % of household income (Vien, 2004). 
Aside from what is used for household consumption, where paddy and upland rice is most 
significant, the entitlements generated for households are saleable agricultural crops, mainly maize, 
cassava roots, and canna, which are sold in bulk either to local middlemen or outside traders 
(Rambo and Vien, 2001). Ginger is also being cultivated, but theft of ginger roots on unguarded 
fields is a constraint on production (Vien, 2004). Theft of crops and livestock is a prevalent problem 
in the village, since no institutions exist that can prevent and punish it. Assets and entitlements are 
thus in many cases not secured. 
There is little cooperation between households, and most rely on relatives for help when 
experiencing economic shocks or stresses. Mutual aid, for field preparation or harvesting, is given 
under highly controlled conditions with reciprocity being a necessity in order to avoid exclusion 
from future exchanges. In other words, close and spontaneous exchanges between households are 
very rare (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 322). A social safety net is lacking in the community which 
means it is relatively easy to fall into poverty and the households‟ lack of social capital could have 
repercussions for the sustainable management of resources. The poor social cohesion is partly due 
to the hamlet‟s history as a society heavily influenced by external forces. Since the building of 
 39 
social institutions and accumulation of social capital in the community has not happened, there is 
now a situation of distrust between the aforementioned actors and also between households. In 
addition, community resources are not always distributed in a fair manner and people with positions 
of authority have been known to take advantage of their power (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 322).  
4.1.2.6. Discussion  
The interface in this case revolves around the social fields of forestry and upland agriculture where 
there is a clear intersection of „lifeworlds‟ between the identified actors involved. Hamlet residents 
are not willing to accommodate to the social worlds of district officials and government policy. The 
role of these State departments and agencies is limited to the issuance of land use regulations and 
policies shaped by macro-level institutions such as national laws. It is the local government (the 
VPC) and the cooperative that is caught between these two conflicting social worlds, and in the 
process attempts to accommodate to both. The willpower and means to enforce government 
regulations regarding forest use and upland agriculture are therefore lacking and policies are often 
imperfectly implemented. Ways in which villagers struggle in this social interface are by either 
refusing to comply or attempting to cheat the local authorities. Poor implementation of policies also 
makes the policies themselves seem vague, with the result that natural resources are over-exploited.  
In addition to the poor implementation of policies, natural resource overexploitation is also caused 
by the lack of community institutions that can regulate and enforce how resources are managed. 
Many villagers do not trust each other and aside from strictly binding reciprocal labour 
arrangements, there is little cooperation between villagers. This is in part due to the fact that the 
hamlet has always been subjected to strong external forces which have created management 
structures above the household level that have often proved to be ineffective in regulating 
exploitation of resources. The household has thus been free to make decisions without adhering to 
any community institutions, which combined with government policies, has led to instances of 
overexploitation of natural resources. 
It is therefore likely that population increase is not the main cause of overexploitation of resources 
in Tat hamlet. It is rather the institutional framework, or rather the lack of institutions, that is the 
main problem behind improper management of resources. The lack of institutions and endowments 
of social capital, a situation that has persisted through years of dominant external influence, the 
modest endowments of natural capital that individual households possess are not transformed into 
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entitlements that enhance capabilities. The average household therefore focuses mainly on 
reproducing itself since it lacks the necessary capabilities for upward social mobility. As such, this 
is an example of a community that definitely does not fit well with the optimistic image of the 
community espoused by proponents of CBNRM, described earlier, and one that would proves a 
challenge for international NGOs seeking to intervene. 
Despite the potential sustainability of the composite-swiddening system, soil quality on swidden 
fields is declining while government intervention has not accommodated to or offered any feasible 
alternatives. While government initiatives have generated some entitlements for households, namely 
the planting of Melia trees, policies in general do not fit well with local conditions. Illegal logging 
and sales of timber are the most important source of cash which completely contradicts government 
forestry policy again proving that the „lifeworlds‟ of farming households and even local authorities 
conflict with district and State officials as well as the national policies that they adhere to.  
The government policies, whose official goal is to improve the economic situation for mountainous 
communities, are also aimed at eradicating swidden farming. What is most problematic about this is 
that fact that the households in Tat hamlet have been using swiddening as a central component of 
their farming system for generations, perhaps even centuries, making the proper implementation of 
these policies and programs extremely difficult. 
Figure 3 illustrates the social arena in which actors and institutions influence household decision-
making. Community institutions are lacking or wholly missing with the result that villagers lack 
social capital endowments. State laws concerning forestry land have made swidden farming in the 
uplands illegal, though the implementation of policies is not well executed and policies are unclear. 
Households are in a situation where they have modest endowments of natural capital, at least 
according to official State laws. The alternative offered by the government is for households to 
receive payment for protection of forestry land, though this is not feasible for villagers, since their 
neighbours enter the land and clear swiddens regardless of regulations. Livelihoods thus depend 
mainly on swidden farming and illegal timber extraction. Decision-making based on existing capital 
endowments generates entitlements from these land use activities. These activities are in direct 
conflict with State laws, while theft and distrust is commonplace in the community due to the lack 
of institutions. While the natural resource base may not be undermined currently, partly due to the 
environmentally sustainable practice of composite-swiddening, households are not likely to recover 
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from major shocks and maintain their capabilities within the existing institutional context. 
Therefore sustainable livelihoods are currently not created.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: actors and institutions in Tat hamlet (dotted lines indicate weak linkages) 
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4.1.3. Case study 2: Ban Trang and Phieng Nhuong  
This study by Castella et al (2005) illustrates the effects of government intervention by comparing 
two villages, Ban Trang and Phieng Nhuong, both located in Duc Van commune, Ngan Son district 
in Bac Kan province, also in North-western Vietnam. Large State forestry and agricultural projects 
have had substantial impacts on land use in the region (Castella et al, 2005: 169-170).  
The landscape in Ngan Son district is characterised by patches of secondary forest, which has more 
or less deteriorated due to years of swidden agriculture, and grass-covered hills. Currently all 
production systems in the district revolve around animal husbandry, especially pig-raising, and 
cultivation of fodder crops (maize, cassava, sweet potatoes) in the uplands (Castella et al, 2005: 
167). Tobacco cultivation has also gained significance since the 1970s, and is cultivated in the 
entire eastern part of the district (Castella, 2005: 169). 
4.1.3.1. Entitlements: animal husbandry and tobacco cultivation 
Animal husbandry generates entitlements for villagers in both Ban Trang and Phieng Nhuong. 
Buffalos are raised for work in the paddy fields while cows are raised primarily to generate cash for 
households. The presence of grass-covered hills, suitable for pasture, has led to several State farm 
projects with the purpose of developing animal husbandry. This has given households in Duc van 
commune years of experience with livestock-raising and expertise in management of animal 
husbandry. (Castella et al, 2005) 
Tobacco production and selling is an important entitlement for households in Phieng Nhuong.  
The nearby village of Ban Khau started growing tobacco in 1971 and production has since then 
spread throughout communes in the district because of both high marketability and low opportunity 
costs. In Phieng Nhuong tobacco is cultivated in paddy fields and is grown in the spring before 
summer rice. Production was managed by cooperatives during the 1970s and early 1980s which 
supplied farmers with chemical inputs and paid them in cash for their harvests. Since then, the State 
tobacco company Vinataba has managed all levels of the production process, supplying farmers 
with packages of inputs and recommendations and reimbursing the cost of fertilizer after harvest. 
On one hand, farmers have benefited from this since they are guaranteed a market for their tobacco 
production. On the other hand, this has made them highly dependent on the company since 
Vinataba is able to fix prices on the harvest. In 1999 the company considered the overall harvested 
 43 
crops that year as being of inferior quality and average prices were cut nearly in half. Farmers 
reacted strongly and the number of households growing tobacco in Ngan Son district dropped from 
80% to 10%. (Castella et al, 2005) 
4.1.3.2. Land use and State intervention in Ban Trang    
The village of Ban Trang is inhabited mainly by the Tày and Nùng ethnic minority groups. The Tày 
is the largest ethnic group in the district, followed by the Nùng, and in much smaller numbers the 
Dao, Hmong and Kinh. Tày and Nùng households in Ban Trang cultivate one-cycle of wet rice in 
the valleys while cultivating maize, cassava, and sweet potatoes in the uplands. The upland crops 
are mainly used as fodder for pigs. Some households also grow perennial fruit trees, however in 
contrast to Phieng Nhuong and other villages in the commune the soil quality in the village fields is 
not sufficient for cultivating tobacco. (Castella et al, 2005) 
A cooperative production system was established in Ban Trang, as well as most of the commune, in 
1960. Ownership of both rice fields in the valleys and upland fields was collectivised and harvests 
were distributed to households according to a labour point system, similar to the one described in 
Tat hamlet. All animals were also collectivised except for pigs, which were allowed to be owned by 
individual households. Almost all household labour was centred on collective duties and individual 
household initiatives were discouraged. (Castella et al, 2005) 
The war against China that started in 1979 caused the Chinese population in Ban Khau, which is 
near Ban Trang, to flee. The cooperative in Ban Khau was transformed into a State farm that 
cultivated the abandoned rice fields. In order to irrigate these rice fields, a reservoir was built in Ban 
Trang, causing major flooding of collectively-managed rice fields. A total of twenty-six households 
were dispossessed of their collective fields and had to move and work at the nearby State farm. 
(Castella et al, 2005) 
Coinciding with the de-collectivisation process and after the end of the war, the Chinese inhabitants 
from Ban Khau returned to reclaim the fields now being used by State farm workers and immigrants 
from Ban Trang. The return of the Chinese made it necessary to move the State farm to Ban Trang 
where it then focused on animal husbandry. Owners of the flooded rice fields reclaimed their former 
land (except the rice fields) while other workers from the State farm were settled further upstream. 
Because of the problem of insufficient rice fields in the village, all families associated with the State 
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farm were assisted by the State in the relocation process and were given a third of the capital to 
build a house, labour to build stables, as well as tax exemptions. (Castella et al, 2005) 
The lack of paddy fields, a result of State intervention, put pressure on upland fields in the village. 
While the original inhabitants intensified production on upland fields, the newly settled State farm 
workers cleared new swiddens. The resulting decrease in upland yields forced the original 
inhabitants to put pressure on the Agricultural Service, a State agency in the district, to take action. 
In 1991 the State agency drained the reservoir to increase the availability of lowland paddy fields 
which then significantly reduced swidden cultivation. While it allowed the original inhabitants to 
reclaim old fields, the draining of the reservoir also opened up the possibility for new arrivals to 
purchase paddy land in the village. They were able to do this with their salaries from the State farm 
and currently no land is left in the valley flatlands to purchase or develop. State farm workers had a 
significant advantage over their neighbours. In addition to owning paddy land, as workers on a State 
farm focusing on raising animals, they were able to develop their cattle production faster than other 
households. As part of their payment for watching specific herds they were given half of each 
year‟s newborns and the pensions they received allowed them to purchase additional animals. 
(Castella et al, 2005) 
Program 327 also reached Ban Trang where forestry land also remained the property of the State. 
Land parcels were allocated to households, who were responsible for protecting it for periods of 50 
years. While the forest service at the province level would decide which areas needed protection, an 
official from the district forest service would implement the plan in cooperation with commune 
authorities. The official would suggest species to plant and then sign an agreement with each 
farmer, who would receive payment for protection services. The size of payment would depend on 
whether the land was declared natural forest or deteriorated shrub land: in the latter case protection 
would be significantly more profitable amounting to US$73 per hectare the first year, US$20 each 
year the second and third years, and finally US$3 each year from the fourth to the eighth years, 
which in total corresponds to US$125. The World Food Program has also been involved in forest 
protection measures in the region since 1997, offering rice subsidies to households instead of cash 
payment in return for replanting and protection of pine trees amounting to US$64 for each hectare 
the first year and US$21 the second and third years.  
While reforestation projects offer significant profits through State payments, the protected 
forestland now competes with land for upland crops and pastures. Especially the latter is putting 
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pressure on animal husbandry, illustrated by the rise in epizootics, an indication of pasture space 
saturation. This has caused both buffalo and cattle herds to decrease in recent years. Despite this, 
households are not overly concerned with these issues since they await another State initiative that 
can alleviate the current problems. (Castella et al, 2005) 
4.1.3.3. Land use and State intervention in Phieng Nhuong 
The upland village of Phieng Nhuong is mainly populated by members of the Dao ethnic minority 
group and inhabitants rely on tobacco cash-cropping. Land use in Phieng Nhuong has not changed 
significantly in the history of the village. Access to land is achieved only by inheritance which 
remains the primary determinant of social differentiation. The wealthiest families are those that 
have historically held large tracts of land. While sons divide the land among themselves, daughters 
join the families of their husbands and in cases where the landholding is too small to support more 
than one family, the eldest son inherits all the land. The remaining sons can choose to emigrate, stay 
in the village and rely on private initiatives in order to gain income, or marry into a family with only 
daughters and thereby gain access to that family‟s land. This system of inheritance has persisted due 
to the tight land situation; village land is limited and all arable flat land has been converted into rice 
fields. (Castella et al, 2005) 
The Dao in Vietnam are known to display great cohesion in their communities as well as an ability 
to collectively manage resources (Rambo and Vien, 2001: 300). The Dao in Phien Nhuong have 
maintained their traditional system of land inheritance mainly due to the fact that they were able to 
evade the national collectivisation of land. During the cooperative period some Dao families were 
able to purchase fields from Tày farmers in the valley bottom, as an entry ticket to the cooperative, 
and migrated to the lowlands. The State offered incentives for relocation to the lowlands, mainly 
through large investments in the lowland cooperatives. The Dao families, however, only worked on 
their purchased fields, but did not relocate their households to the lowlands. Instead the migrating 
households formed a new hamlet in Phieng Nhuong, where their residential areas were located. 
(Castella et al, 2005) 
Migration alone has not compensated for the scarcity of land in the village but many households 
have proven to be able to use their human capital endowments (mainly initiative and labour) to 
great effect through a number of income-generating activities. The migrating Dao families were 
able to seize upon and benefit from the incentives offered by the State. In addition, these households 
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showed initiative in being able to adapt quickly to new farming practices. The decision to buy 
lowland fields also showed foresight since prices have gone up considerably since then. (Castella et 
al, 2005) 
Allocation of forestland through Program 327 was also offered to villagers in Phieng Nhuong; an 
opportunity that a few families seized upon by receiving up to 50 hectares of forestland each. These 
families now make large profits on the land with minimal labour input. Tobacco producers in the 
village have also used a State incentive to their own advantage, intensifying production on their rice 
fields by including a tobacco crop and thus generating additional income. In order to successfully 
expand their production this way they have had to acquire new technical knowledge and skills. 
Farmers in Phieng Nhuong were also among the first to plant fruit trees and have therefore profited 
most from large market demand. Households in Ban Trang have only just begun to plant fruit trees 
now when the market demand is significantly smaller.  (Castella et al, 2005) 
4.1.3.4. Household decision-making in Ban Trang and Phieng Nhuong 
State interventions, including State farms, tobacco production, forestland allocation and sales of 
paddy land as part of State resettlement policy have had a significant impact on land access and 
capacity of households to seize opportunities. (Castella et al, 2005)  
In Ban Trang, land access has been influenced through the creation of cooperatives, which 
completely altered the rules for accessing land. The cooperatives were followed by interventions 
such as local implementation of resettlement policies, creation of State farms, and infrastructure 
projects (i.e. flooding of rice fields in Ban Trang). All of these initiatives resulted in numerous 
migrations, land dispossessions, and re-acquisitions of land in Ban Trang. This can be explained by 
the nature of society in Vietnam‟s centrally-planned economy, aspects of which still exist today: 
while government officials believe they can do their jobs well without consulting the affected 
population, the local population believe it is impossible to influence the government or its officials 
(Binh, 1998). This holds especially true for communities that lack informal institutions.  
The households that benefited most from State initiatives were the farmers who were given the 
largest paddy land areas after de-collectivisation, households that were allocated large forestland 
plots and thus received maintenance salaries for protecting the land, and State farm workers who 
received salaries and pensions (Castella et al, 2005). Households in Ban Trang have not benefited as 
a result of initiative and strategic decision-making, but rather the random effects of government 
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intervention. Furthermore, some households have not had access to entitlements such as pensions 
and maintenance salaries but have still felt negative effects of State intervention, such as population 
pressure.  
A comparison of Ban Trang and Phieng Nhuong shows that the capacity of households to seize 
opportunities is directly related to the frequency of State interventions (Castella, 2005: 178). In Ban 
Trang the cooperatives removed all decision-making power from households and following the 
cooperative period, frequent changes in land policy and migrations also made private initiatives or 
long-term planning difficult. State reforestation and forest protection programs have also offered 
little in the way of individual initiative and villagers “are waiting for the next State intervention; 
waiting to be told what to do with the forest…” (Castella, 2005: 179).   
Households in Phieng Nhuong, on the other hand, have retained complete decision-making power, 
partly due to the village‟s evasion of the cooperative system, and have experienced a limited 
number of external interventions. The main forms of intervention have been Vinataba‟s offer of 
tobacco production packages and the State‟s forest protection program. In both of these instances 
households have not been forced to comply but have rather been offered an opportunity for 
investment. In this sense, different „lifeworlds‟ have not conflicted and both district officials and 
households have experienced a mutually beneficial venture.  
There are differences in the institutional setting in the two villages. In addition to its customary 
tenure system that regulates land access, Phieng Nhuong clearly has a more effective system for 
diffusing innovations and production strategies. Ban Trang, having depended on instructions from 
State officials and agencies, lacks effective institutions including proper networks for sharing of 
information, knowledge, and experiences. The example of fruit trees highlights the contrast between 
the two villages. An effective information sharing network resulted in the rapid introduction of fruit 
trees in Phieng Nhuong. (Castella et al, 2005) 
4.1.3.5. Discussion  
State farm workers originally from Ban Trang and Ban Khau have benefited from the government‟s 
support, which has allowed many of these villagers to purchase paddy rice fields and to better 
develop their animal husbandry activities in comparison with the remaining villagers in Ban Trang.  
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In contrast to Tat hamlet the State has always had a strong interest in developing Ban Trang, owing 
to its natural resources which are perfectly suited to animal husbandry. The State has therefore been 
more closely involved in the management of these resources and district officials have been more 
present in the villages. However, national policies concerning forest protection, such as Program 
327, have changed both the landscape and livelihoods in Ban Trang. Households that protect forest 
land under Program 327 generate an average profit of US$125 per hectare in total over a period of 
eight years, corresponding to US$16 per year. This is a significant addition to annual income, which 
in 2004 was US$198 per capita in North-western Vietnam (General Statistics Office of Vietnam) 
and households can use this cash for investment purposes. However, protected forest land now 
competes with space for pastures (for grazing) and upland crops (used as animal fodder) in much of 
the district. Since animal husbandry generates the most important entitlement for households in Ban 
Trang, especially considering that the soil is not suitable for tobacco cultivation, the pressure on 
natural resources will increase. In addition, decisions concerning land management in Ban Trang 
have always been made by the State and since the cooperative period individual household 
decision-making has been discouraged. This has left villagers unable to respond independently to a 
situation in which their animal husbandry entitlements are threatened. Instead villagers are wholly 
dependent on the next State intervention.  
The frequency of state intervention has effectively removed decision-making power from individual 
households in Ban Trang. The numerous changes in policy, new initiatives, and discouragement of 
private initiatives have resulted in a situation where villagers do not to make their own decisions. 
The lack of institutions and human capital such as information networks and access to market 
information reinforces the need for external guidance and influence. State programmes have 
become so commonplace that villagers always comply and follow whatever narratives the State 
may offer. Some State initiatives generate entitlements and capabilities, such as high salaries and 
pensions from State farms and forest maintenance pay, which may contribute to building up 
financial capital endowments. However, stocks of natural resources are not able to support a second 
crop such as tobacco in the lowlands, while the State‟s forest protection initiatives put pressure on 
space for both crops and pasture in the uplands. The case of Ban Trang illustrates the conflicting 
„lifeworlds‟ of the State and local population. The entire district is dependent on animal husbandry 
in order to generate entitlements and the hills have been used as pasture land for years with the State 
playing an instrumental role in developing animal husbandry in the region. However, now State 
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policies of forest protection have led to pasture space saturation. District officials have simply not 
taken these issues into account when implementing government Program 327 in the region. 
In contrast, villagers in Phieng Nhuong were able to resist the nation-wide collectivisation which 
left them in a better position to pursue private initiatives. The decision-making exhibited by 
households indicate that they possess a greater stock of livelihood resources, in this case both 
human (skills, knowledge) and social (information sharing networks) capital as well as village 
institutions that govern land access. Households have responded successfully to the scarcity of land 
in Phieng Nhuong through livelihood strategies characterised by migration and diversification of 
income-generating activities such as purchasing and working in paddy fields in the lowlands and by 
growing fruit trees. .Moreover, the Dao households in Phieng Nhuong have been able to respond 
successfully to State intervention on their own terms. Capital-led intensive tobacco cultivation and 
forest protection are examples of State initiatives that villagers have seized upon to build up their 
stock of capital endowments, gain new entitlements and capabilities, and reinvesting them. The few 
households that chose to protect parcels of forestry land have also benefited immensely.   
The human and social capital endowments that the Dao villagers in Phieng Nhuong posses, as 
illustrated by the examples above, give them the ability to cope with stresses and shocks much 
better than villagers in Ban Trang. The capabilities they generate allow them to create sustainable 
livelihoods, unlike households in Ban Trang who will most likely require further State or other 
external intervention in order to cope with stresses and shocks, such as the prevailing saturation of 
pasture land. 
4.1.4. Case study 3: Ma hamlet and Chieng Dong commune  
The following case study relates to the Land Law which the Vietnamese National Assembly passed 
in July 1993, and specifically the allocation of land and issuing of land certificates in upland areas 
of Vietnam. Two case studies of Black Thai communities are used in order to illustrate how local, 
„internal‟ forces can counteract external intervention. Like the Dao, the Black Thai are known for 
the social cohesion of their communities (Sikor, 2006: 619). The importance of traditional 
structures and institutions governing land access are thus highlighted in the following discussion.  
Together with the White Thai, the Black Thai account for the majority of the population of North-
Western Vietnam (Sikor, 2006: 619) but are also found in other parts of the country. Leisz (2006) 
conducted a study of Ma hamlet in Tuong Duong district in Nghe An province in North-Central 
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Vietnam. The hamlet is very isolated and almost all members are of Black Thai ethnicity. Sikor 
(2002 and 2006) conducted several studies in Chieng Dong commune in Yen Chau district of Son 
La province, which includes ten villages, all inhabited by Black Thai. Both these studies concern 
themselves with the broader issues of post-socialist land relations, property rights, and land tenure. 
However, for the purpose of this thesis, they will be analysed using the theoretical framework 
described in chapter 2. 
4.1.4.1. Social organisation and land allocation in Ma hamlet 
Ma hamlet was founded by four households totalling 40 people in 1949. These original four 
lineages have maintained their authority and importance throughout the village‟s history. During the 
short period of State production groups from 1956-1959 the four lineages organised themselves into 
four production groups, thus retaining the status of the lineage as a social authoritarian entity. 
During the cooperative period the lineage leaders became cooperative leaders and when the 
cooperatives‟ importance declined the lineage leaders took positions in the hamlet‟s branch of the 
party and local government. Currently, the head of the communist party and the official hamlet 
leadership are all important members of the four lineages and lineage elders are still consulted 
before important decisions are made. (Leisz, 2006) 
Both workgroup and cooperative leaders allowed villagers to adhere to the rules regarding land 
rights followed by the original lineages, so long as they acknowledged the authority of the 
cooperative. In addition, the farming system continued to be based on rotational swidden 
agriculture, with upland rice as the main crop, which was the system traditionally practiced by the 
four lineages. The leadership of both the workgroups and the cooperative would decide which areas 
to be cleared each year for upland rice and who would work in which fields. In addition, the original 
rules of land access were also the same as before and have continued to apply to this day. This 
customary system of tenure is highly organized, regulating access to and management of land in the 
hamlet. (Leisz, 2006) 
A farmer will claim his field in an area where his lineage is. If the farmer wishes to claim a field 
outside the area of his lineage, approval is needed from that lineage. Furthermore, it is necessary for 
the farmer to announce an intention to clear a field since other members of the lineage have the 
right to veto the clearing. In addition, the lineage/hamlet leaders also need to give their approval. If 
approved, the clearing of a field will give the household use and exclusionary rights for the 
 51 
cultivation period, which is usually 1 year unless yields are exceptionally good. After that the 
household loses all rights to that field except if it wants to cultivate it again, in which case it can 
reject others. These rules apply to all members of the hamlet and lineage. In contrast to the Dao in 
Phieng Nhuong there are no inheritance rights. Being a member of the lineage gives you rights to 
access and use land in the hamlet. (Leisz, 2006) 
In addition to having a highly cohesive community with accumulated social capital, Ma hamlet has 
also benefited from political capital. Many men from Ma hamlet fought for Vietnam in both the war 
for independence against the French and during the Vietnam War. In 1964, one of the first people to 
settle in Ma became a member of the National Assembly, making him the only person from the 
commune to take up such an important position (Leisz, 2006).  
Following the Land Law and Forest Allocation Law (both from 1993), officials from the district and 
Hanoi came to the commune to allocate land according to these laws. In all the hamlets that border 
Ma, all land (including forest land) was allocated, official maps were drawn, and households 
received Red Book land certificates. In Ma, however, the hamlet elders and leaders refused to 
comply and threatened the officials with bodily harm if they did not leave. The allocation did not 
happen and until 2002 land was distributed according to the existing customary system. This did not 
only happen in Ma; administrative officials were threatened and not allowed to allocate land in 
other hamlets in the same period (Leisz, 2006). In the social interface regarding land access, the 
„lifeworlds‟ of local government and villagers were openly in conflict with district officials and no 
process of accommodation happened on the issue of land distribution. Lineage leaders had, since 
the founding of the hamlet, always had the final say on access to land. 
After the passing of Decree No. 85/1999/ND-CP in 1999 the situation changed. Until then, sloping 
land, was only considered to be forestry land (Leisz, 2006; Sikor, 2002; Sikor, 2006). However in 
the decree, the wording is more open to different interpretations and it is indicated that sloping land, 
that historically has been used for the household economy (meaning that it has been cleared for 
cultivation), can be allocated to households (Leisz, 2006). In general, Vietnamese agricultural and 
forestry policies have been considered open to different interpretations. The biggest differences in 
interpretation often exist between the grassroots level and the policy formulation level (Binh, 1998). 
The new interpretation of the law is the one officials used when they returned to Ma hamlet in 2002. 
The result was that all land that presently or in the past had been cleared for swidden agriculture 
could be allocated to households in the hamlet. State officials were thus accommodating to the 
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wishes of hamlet leaders and elders. Officials would also allow villagers the right to trade allocated 
land between them and organize themselves to use the allocated land as they pleased. In effect this 
meant that any kind of yearly rotation of fields would be possible and that the customary system of 
land distribution could continue unchanged. (Leisz, 2006) 
Though the Black Thai traditionally practice paddy rice cultivation (Vien, 2003), the most 
important entitlements for Ma households are derived from upland crops, especially rice which is 
the main crop, as well as maize and cassava (Leisz, 2006: 7). Although the swidden farming system 
is integral to the livelihoods of villagers in Ma hamlet, households have also engaged in successful 
income-generating activities, for example capturing a market by planting local species of valuable 
bamboo twenty years before other hamlets followed suit. In addition, when the district offered free 
cement to hamlets for road construction, Ma hamlet took advantage of this opportunity and used the 
cement for building walking paths in the hamlet (Leisz, 2006: 12-13). Decision-making power is 
thus largely in the hands of the hamlet community and household decision-making is strongly 
influenced by community institutions.  
4.1.4.2. Social organisation and land access in Chieng Dong commune 
Before the period of collectivization after Vietnam gained independence, Black Thai villages in 
Chieng Dong were exclusively subsistence-oriented and derived most of their dietary needs from 
wet-rice cultivation. In addition to providing crops, upland areas were also used for grazing of 
buffaloes and forest products (Sikor, 2002: 5) Chieng Dong commune had been ruled by a local 
leader during the feudal period as part of a larger hierarchical system similar to the one described in 
Tat hamlet. Villages were forced to supply shares of the paddy harvest and labour to the local 
leader, but village communities maintained collective control on land so long as they fulfilled 
obligations towards the local leader. Households held rights to cultivate paddy rice and upland 
fields, graze buffaloes, and collect forest products in return for fulfilling their obligations to the 
village community, which entailed that each household contributed a share of their product. In 
contrast to Tat hamlet, community institutions existed in Chieng Dong villages during the feudal 
period (Sikor, 2006: 620)  
After forests were nationalized in 1955 most of the upland areas in the district were controlled by 
the Agricultural Office and later the Forest Protection Unit, both district departments. This meant 
that villagers had to ask permission to use the forest for anything but collection of dry firewood and 
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minor forest products. However, district officials were initially sympathetic to villagers who did not 
encounter any problems in getting the timber and swidden fields necessary to cover subsistence 
needs. They also lacked the capacity to enforce regulations against villagers‟ resistance. During 
collectivisation the cooperatives oversaw the allocation of upland fields to production brigades after 
which conflicts over land became more pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s when households 
expanded individual use of the uplands during the gradual de-collectivisation. During this period, 
the Forest Protection Unit fined villagers for their illegal exploitation of resources, but fines were 
too low to discourage villagers. Villagers cleared new fields and expanded livestock herds so that 
by the end of the 1980s land for cultivation had become scarce. Conflicts over the use of land 
became more frequent. (Sikor, 2006) 
The institutions that have determined access to upland fields are different from those that have 
determined access to paddy fields. In 1960, the villages in Chieng Dong commune formed small 
cooperatives that managed cultivation of paddy rice fields. Cooperative leaders were elected by 
villagers under supervision by district officials. Neither these officials nor the State intervened in 
the election process, causing village communities in Chieng Dong to remain essentially the same 
under the cooperative as under French rule. The only essential change that occurred was that 
households were replaced by production brigades as the lowest level of social organisation 
regarding the daily management of paddy rice fields. (Sikor, 2006; Sikor, 2002) 
Gradually, during the period of de-collectivisation in the 1980s, households once again held 
cultivation rights and village communities re-emerged, as did the system of obligations towards the 
community (Sikor, 2006: 621).  
4.1.4.3. Land allocation in Chieng Dong commune 
Land certificates were issued and distributed to villagers in Chieng Dong in 1994. District officials, 
village leaders, and villagers documented upland fields after villagers had reported them. Most 
villagers also received forest protection contracts, again under Program 327. Large areas of the 
uplands were demarcated as forestry land and some areas were designated as common grazing land. 
The intention was now that land should be used solely for one purpose: either grazing, forest 
protection or cultivation. Furthermore, the motive behind the new allocation of land was to put an 
end to the flexible negotiations between the local population and district authorities and to create 
fixed boundaries between households and villages in the commune. (Sikor, 2002; Sikor, 2006) 
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The flexibility of land use remained in the uplands, however, as households expanded their fields 
into forestry land and exchanged fields among each other, none of which was recorded by the 
authorities. Within 3 years land under cultivation exceeded the allocated area by more than 70%. 
Households with forest protection contracts could not stop fellow villagers from clearing fields on 
the land.  Therefore, large discrepancies existed between actual land holdings and the information 
listed in Red Book land certificates. In addition, the certificates only contained rough estimates of 
land holdings and not the actual location. However, as in Tat hamlet, households kept their 
certificates as evidence of a share of village land. The district authorities considered their task 
finished when all households had received land certificates, even though these did not relate at all to 
proper fields. Village community leaders did enforce one aspect of the district authorities‟ land 
allocation regulations: the boundaries between villages in Chieng Dong commune were rigid. 
Collective adjustment of upland fields for the sake of equity was imposed by village community 
leaders in one village. (Sikor, 2002; Sikor, 2006) 
While the allocation of forestry land and demarcation of the uplands was a failure, State allocation 
of paddy rice fields never even happened in Chieng Dong. Due to the intense resistance by both 
villagers as well as village community leaders, who until then had maintained authority over paddy 
rice allocation, paddy fields were not included in the land certificates that were issued in 1994. This 
was a conscious decision by the district authorities who feared an open confrontation with villagers 
since all villages in the commune collectively stood together. This enabled them to modify the 
implementation of government policy in the commune. (Sikor, 2002; Sikor, 2006) 
Community leaders were committed to an equitable use of paddy rice fields and, as in Ma hamlet, 
fields were re-allocated when necessary. Strict rules of obligation towards the community continued 
to determine households access to fields and some households have lost their fields for having 
provided finance or labour to community projects. The rules governing access to paddy land also 
included a requirement of using conservation measures, such as bunds and irrigation canals, on the 
fields. If households fail to meet these requirements they are also excluded from fields (Sikor, 2002; 
Sikor, 2006). Community leaders have also encouraged investment in new paddy rice fields, and 
have allowed a periodic exemption from community obligations to those households that build new 
terraces. This proves that land certificates aren‟t necessary in order to promote agricultural 
investment (Sikor, 2002; Sikor, 2006). 
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4.1.4.4. Discussion 
The remoteness of Ma hamlet has made proper implementation of State policies difficult since local 
State agencies are under-funded and lack means of transportation to travel to the most remote areas. 
District officials have therefore been more willing to accommodate to the wishes of villagers and 
village leaders in social interfaces characterised by conflict, specifically regarding the land law and 
allocation process.  
The hamlet has also been in a better position for negotiation due to the capital endowments that 
have been accumulated over time. Villagers have accumulated a large stock of social capital both 
through political affiliations and the social infrastructure that the lineages have provided. These 
institutions, such as shared norms and values, have ensured that the hamlet community have had a 
strong influence on household decision-making. In addition, the community has made several 
successful ventures such as growing a valuable bamboo species and securing cement for village use. 
Through negotiations with the authorities, households have secured their entitlements that are 
derived from swidden farming. The difference between Ma hamlet and Tat hamlet is that, while 
both practice traditional agriculture in direct conflict with State laws, Ma hamlet has strong 
institutions that not only enable sustainable management of resources and equitable distribution of 
land holdings, but also allows collective action to modify local implementation of these laws or the 
ability to accommodate to the external structures imposed by the State. 
Isolation, a strong institutional foundation, and capital endowments have enabled Ma lineage 
leaders to maintain their authority through strategic community decision-making and have made 
them powerful negotiators during the land allocation process. They have accommodated to the Land 
Law by pressuring State officials into reinterpreting the law and currently it seems that the 
customary tenure system coexists with the official government system of land allocation. The fact 
that private land ownership was rejected by villagers and that the customary system remains intact 
even after the period of collectivisation, indicates that villagers in Ma hamlet have capabilities that 
create sustainable livelihoods, though which are heavily dictated by the cohesive community 
institutions.       
Villagers in Chieng Dong have been able to resist the State-sanctioned land allocation of paddy 
fields since their lifeworlds have been at odds with the State‟s contention that private land 
ownership, legitimised through land certificates, enhances tenure security and environmental 
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sustainability. Villagers‟ rejection of private land ownership can be explained by the fact that the 
system of land access and use managed by the village community has always served villagers well. 
Environmental sustainability of livelihoods also seems secure since villagers are required to use soil 
conservation measures in order to access paddy fields. 
Village community leaders have, on the strength of village institutions, been able to negotiate with 
district authorities who in turn have had a slack attitude towards implementation, requiring mainly 
that households receive their land certificates so that it can be reported to the next administrative 
level. Again, this is an example of the government‟s top-down approach and the weak linkages 
between government administrative levels. 
Demarcation of upland areas and boundaries and forest allocation in Chieng Dong has largely 
failed. The village communities have had less influence on upland areas, and households have had 
more freedom to exploit forest resources, areas for grazing, and areas for cultivation. State officials 
have in this case also been willing to accommodate to and negotiate with village communities, and 
only the threat of minor fines has been used to enforce forest regulations. Unregulated use of the 
forest has led to the clearing of 70% more new land than the allocated; thus stocks of natural 
resources, the main livelihood resource may be threatened. However, village community institutions 
strongly enforce the boundaries between villages, and have intervened with equitable redistribution 
of land on at least one occasion. 
4.1.5. Discussion 
The case study of Tat hamlet illustrated the detrimental impact of external influence on the social 
organisation and cohesiveness of a community, which has had significant repercussions for natural 
resource management and the creation of sustainable livelihoods. In Ban Trang, the frequency of 
government intervention has affected household decision-making and now constitutes a 
constraining factor on individual initiative and the ability to take independent action.  
These negative impacts of government intervention are further aggravated by poor implementation 
of government policies at the local level due to weak linkages between administrative levels, lack of 
funding in remote areas, and vague policies open to different interpretations. 
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The village of Phieng Nhuong and the Black Thai communities offer contrasting examples of how 
combinations of social capital, human capital, and informal institutions have served to modify the 
implementation of government policy to the advantage of the local community. 
There is an indication that ample endowments of capital and strong informal institutions result in a 
greater ability to pursue worthwhile household or community strategies that result in sustainable 
livelihoods. However, it is not possible to develop a pattern or blueprint. The complexities and 
uncertain environments that characterise mountainous communities illustrated in the case studies 
above would argue against an LFA intervention that relies mainly on expected outcomes and a 
limited number of calculated risks and assumptions.  
4.2. International NGOs and planned intervention 
The previous section detailed the internal and - to a larger degree - external factors that potentially 
constrain the operational space of international NGOs and community-based organisations. The 
differential outcomes of intervention described in the last section highlights the complexity that is 
central to the analysis of the main case study of CARE in the Phu Yen district. International NGOs, 
such as CARE, that are working in Vietnam have become commonplace and the concepts “NGO” 
and “development” have evolved from being Western concepts into being familiar terms among 
Vietnamese people (Binh, 1998). One advantage to their presence in Vietnam is that they have 
enabled the emergence of domestic NGOs in the country. Although many of these lack 
sophisticated strategies and run on a contract basis, some have become respected organisations. 
Vietnamese NGOs obtain their contracts from international NGOs, often offering their services for 
project activities in rural areas.  
The majority of international NGOs in Vietnam work in rural areas and many of them deliver 
services in the Northern provinces located in highland areas (Binh, 1998: 13), including Son La, 
Hoa Binh, and Bac Kan. Many focus on natural resource management and often favour initiatives 
that promote higher agricultural productivity and restoration of forest cover; initiatives which are 
seen as a means to overcome food shortages, alleviate poverty, and to a lesser degree increasing 
sustainable land use. Three examples of these initiatives are sloping agricultural land techniques 
(SALT), low external input agro-forestry, and reforestation (Binh, 1998; 13).  
These international NGOs also limit their work to projects that produce concrete and tangible 
outcomes, maintaining their agency at the grassroots level, instead of attempting to influence policy 
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at higher levels (Binh, 1998: 14). Different agricultural and natural resource management projects 
in Vietnam are usually implemented with the same approach and involve the selection of a number 
of „progressive‟ households that carry out field trials with financial and technical support from the 
NGO (Long, 2001; Binh, 1998: 13). To ensure replication of these practices other farmers are 
invited to visit the trials and learn from the demonstrating households. In some cases trips to other 
provinces are organised. In addition, local authorities and extension staff are sometimes trained in 
management and practical skills in order to sustain the activities after the project ends (Binh, 1998; 
CARE, 2004b). 
This section has two objectives. The first is to elucidate how international NGOs that focus on rural 
development operate in the social field described above. These NGOs are often in a position where 
they have to accommodate to two conflicting social worlds. On one hand, in order to operate and 
deliver their services, NGOs must adhere to government institutions, for example by working with 
district governmental departments and mass organisations. On the other hand, they seek to promote 
civil society through grassroots development and seek to mainly represent the interests of their local 
target groups and beneficiaries. Being in this political bind limits the operational space of 
international NGOs and produces unintended effects. The second objective is to analyse the means 
of intervention used by international NGOs to uncover how they differ from governmental 
implementation methods as well as their level of success in developing rural mountainous 
communities in Vietnam. CARE International is used as a representative example of an 
international NGO for the purpose of analysis.  
4.2.1. CARE in Vietnam: Partnerships as the driving force for change 
Founded in 1945 after World War II, “Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere” or 
CARE as it is referred to today eventually evolved into one of the largest private international 
humanitarian organisations in the world with a staff of 12.000 people, the majority of which is 
local, and programmes in 72 countries. The organisation consists of 12 member countries, including 
the US, Japan, Australia, France and Denmark. The CARE country offices in each of the member 
countries fund projects in specific developing regions and countries which are often chosen in 
accordance with their own governments‟ foreign aid strategies. 
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CARE Denmark has planned and funded a number of projects in Vietnam. All of the organisation‟s 
activities in Vietnam and the projects implemented by „CARE in Vietnam‟4 are now assembled in 
the form of one program, called Civil Action for Socio-economic Inclusion in Natural Resource 
Management (CASI). The program started in 2002 as a response to rural poverty and to the 
burgeoning civil society in Vietnam. CARE sees civil society as a means to help the poor out of 
poverty in an effective and sustainable manner, and which in turn will gain credibility with the 
Vietnamese government (CARE, 2004a). The program started in 2002 and has now reached its 
second phase which is a six-year period running from 2004 to 2009. Implementation of planned 
activities in the program is carried out in coordinated components, or projects, each with a discrete 
timeline and developed using an LFA matrix. Currently, these projects are undertaken in three rural 
provinces, including Hoa Binh and Son La in North-western Vietnam (see map in appendix). CARE 
places emphasis on targeting the poorest of the poor in these areas (CARE, 2004a), and claim that 
each component is designed specifically for this purpose.  
In order to fulfil their goals of alleviating rural poverty and improving livelihoods, CARE uses 
partners that come from Vietnamese civil society. These partners include mass organisations, 
farmers‟ cooperatives, NGOs, and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) (CARE, 2004a). 
Around 30 mass organisations exist in Vietnam including the Women‟s Union and the Farmer‟s 
Union. Mass organisations have traditionally been an extended arm of the State with a mandate to 
help implement government policies and organise a specific sector of the population as is often 
implied by the name of the organisation (CARE, 2004a: 11). However, these organisations are also 
asked to give policy feedback based on the interests of their particular constituents. CBOs include 
thousands of groups and associations that do not have formal legal status. Many of them have been 
created by rural development projects (CARE, 2004a: 12) planned by outside organisations. The 
rest are formed by the communities themselves including different cooperative groups that involve 
the sharing of assets and decision-making for the purpose of self-help and mutual assistance 
between households (CARE, 2004a: 12-13). CARE international uses these civil society 
organisations in order to fulfil its goal of empowering the poorest, especially targeting women and 
ethnic minority groups, so they can influence decision-making regarding issues that affect their 
lives. Inclusion and participation are thus considered the driving forces for change and the direct 
                                                 
4
 ‟CARE in Vietnam‟ is a „recipient country‟ counterpart to CARE international and has its main office in Hanoi where 
most activities are coordinated. Most projects are funded by AusAid and CARE Australia, but projects related to 
agriculture and NRM are mainly funded by DANIDA and CARE Denmark. 
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target groups are not only the resource-dependent farmers but also the staff of partner organisations. 
(CARE, 2004a) 
4.2.2. The Phu Yen district 
Phu Yen district in Son La province has been subject to implementation of several projects and 
programmes, both governmental and NGO-driven. The following sub-chapters describe previous 
planned intervention projects by CARE international, focusing on the Community Organisation 
Strengthening (COS) component of the CASI programme, a two-year project which was completed 
in December 2006.  
The population in Phu Yen district is around 100,000 people, with a population growth rate of 
1.4%, and 44,000 people being of working age. There are 22 ethnic minorities living in Phu Yen of 
which the Muong, Thai and Kinh are the largest groups, comprising 42%, 30%, and 11% of the 
district population, respectively. They are followed by the Hmong (10%) and Dao (6%). While the 
Muong and Thai in Phu Yen are culturally closer to the Kinh people, many Dao and Hmong 
villagers only speak their own language and live in the more remote communes of the district. The 
communes visited during the field work were all had either Muong, Thai, or Kinh inhabitants. 
The three communes selected for field work are located in different areas of the district (see map in 
appendix). The natural conditions differ across communes as does the ethnic groups that live there. 
The Economic Department of Phu Yen has divided the district into four subzones based on 
topography, climate, ethnic composition, and location in order to manage and control the different 
areas of the district effectively. Tan Lang, the first of the three communes, is located in sub-zone 1, 
which comprises 38% of the area of the district and 24% of the population. This area has the most 
abundant primary forest and the climate is both cool and humid, making it suitable for growing tea, 
soybean and fruit trees. Villages in this sub-zone generally have the most fertile soils in the district. 
The people in the study villages of Tan Lang are Kinh and Muong. 
Tuong Ha and Tuong Phong, the other two communes, are located in sub-zone 3 which has more 
hilly and mountainous terrain than sub-zone 1. This area has also experienced more severe flooding 
of agricultural land from the Da River reservoir, formed during construction of the Hoa Binh dam. 
The population in these two communes is mainly comprised of Thai, Muong, Hmong and Dao with 
interethnic marriage between Muong and Thai being a common phenomenon. Muong and Thai 
households predominate in the study villages in Tuong Ha and Tuong Phong.  
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4.2.2.1. Endowments, entitlements and livelihood strategies in Phu Yen district 
In addition to the diverse natural environment and ethnic composition, the three selected communes 
also differed with regards to livelihood strategies and land use. Households in Tan Lang and Tuong 
Ha relied on paddy rice cultivation to cover their subsistence needs. Surplus paddy rice was usually 
sold and was an income source in these two communes. Paddy rice and upland fodder crops for 
animals constituted significant entitlements for the population in Tan Lang commune while 
cultivation of saleable upland crops was the most important aspect of livelihoods in Tuong Ha and 
Tuong Phong. Here, the average farmer had limited endowments of natural and financial capital; the 
average land holding – which could include upland fields, forestry land, paddy rice fields, and home 
gardens - for non-model households in Tuong Ha was 1.05 hectares and problems of debt were 
widespread. Tuong Phong farmers had more land, but the quality was so poor that it was difficult to 
cultivate.  
Respondents in all three communes were asked to identify their two most important income 
sources. The results are shown in figure 4.   
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Figure 4: The main income sources of HH in the three communes 
Over 95% of all households depended on upland cash crops as their main income source, and 
around 90% were highly dependent on animal husbandry as well. The main cash crops cultivated on 
slopes were maize and soybean, both of which were sold. Cassava generated a number of 
entitlements for villagers in all three communes: it was grown as a cash crop (in Tuong Phong and 
Tuong Ha), for subsistence and animal fodder (in Tan Lang), or for making wine (in Tuong Phong) 
which was also sold. Maize from Son La province plays an important role in the market as it is 
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often transported to animal producers in the Red River Delta and is considered having the highest 
quality compared with other major sources in North Central and South Vietnam as well as imports 
from China (Huan et al, 2002). However, the farmers in Phu Yen district were not aware of where 
their product ended up, and due to their dependence on loans they had to sell their product 
immediately after harvest. This gave them low bargaining power, despite having a high quality 
product to sell.  
Figure 5 shows which animals were most important for households in all three communes. Most 
households had pigs, oxen, and chickens. New breeds of pigs were introduced by CARE during the 
1990s and sow-raising activities, supervised by the Agricultural Extension Station (AES), were 
supported also supported by the organisation. 
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Figure 5: Animal husbandry in all three communes (total) 
Villagers in all three communes were dependent on external inputs for upland crop production, such 
as High Yielding Varieties (HYV) of seeds, chemical fertilizer, and pesticides. HYV were promoted 
by CARE during the 1990s (Folving, 2007). The villagers purchased inputs for upland crop 
cultivation either from an agricultural input shop in a nearby town or directly in the villages. 
Farmers in Tan Lang and Tuong Ha commune used insecticides, pesticides and chemical fertilizer 
on their fields. The need for these inputs were mainly due to the prevalence of paddy rice 
cultivation practiced by both Kinh and Muong farmers. The livelihood strategies of villagers were 
beginning to be characterised by capital-led intensification, driven by both policy and external 
inputs.   
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The respondents in all villages also identified the off-farm income sources that they rely on most, 
shown in figure 6. Of these, fishing and trading were the most important income sources. Farmers 
rely on fishing if planting of cash crops is postponed or given up due to erratic weather conditions. 
According to one farmer in Tuong Ha commune, it is easy to sell fish at the moment and the price 
for fish is US$2/kg. Fishing in the Da River can generate a profit of as much as US$7 per day. 
During a PRA session in a village conducted by agricultural extension workers, villagers identified 
the need for fishing nets as the third most important priority in the future, following improvement of 
the irrigation system and clean water supply. Access to capital for buying fishing boats was 
identified as the eighth most important priority. This indicates that the villagers want to focus more 
on fishing in the future, which may effect the time spent on upland soil conservation measures. 
Trading is the second most important income source, though there was only one respondent 
working as a trader. Traders are sometimes local wholesalers or assemblers who buy the villagers 
production directly in the villages. Aside from fishing, however, there were no real diversification 
strategies used by villagers.  
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Figure 6: Off-farm income sources in the three communes 
The uncertain natural environment produced several shocks and stresses for households. In addition 
to the scarce livelihood resources, villagers‟ main constraints to upland crop cultivation were pests, 
drought, and heavy rainfall. Households therefore had coping strategies such as fishing, which were 
used especially in Tuong Ha and Tuong Phong in order to maximise their capabilities. However, 
both fishing and linking households‟ maize production to buyers in the delta has yet to be included 
in government and NGO interventions.  
 64 
4.2.2.2. Government intervention in Phu Yen district 
The governmental land allocation program was finalised in the mid-1990s and households in the 
Phu Yen district received formal Red Book land certificates. However, some villages in the district 
already had well-defined systems of customary tenure regulations that defined land use rights 
among both families and lineages (Folving, 2007: 45).  
Villagers in the three communes did not clearly understand or accept the Red Book and formal land 
use rights. Some claimed that the certificate gave the household eternal rights to their land while 
other respondents did not know what rights the formal land certificate ensured the household. While 
the majority of households could produce their Red Book, many could not understand the 
information contained within. In Tuong Ha commune, 75% of questionnaire respondents did not 
know how many years they were allowed to use their upland fields. An extension worker from the 
AES was present during most interviews in the commune and in most cases had to assist the 
respondents in understanding what was written and declared in the Red Book. Finally, some 
households cultivated their upland fields without holding a Red Book certificate. Similar to the case 
studies in the previous chapter, the government land allocation did not appear to achieve its 
intended objectives in Phu Yen. 
Several forestry programs had reached villages in the three communes. District officials 
implementing government Program 747 - concerning reforestation and forest protection - had made 
contracts with 42% of the respondent households. These households had received parcels of land 
from the district authorities in order to plant trees for natural regeneration purposes (protection 
forestry), fruit and timber tree species for selling (production forestry), while some had received 
parcels of both types of land. According to the respondents, each household had received land 
parcels ranging from two to nine hectares of protection forestry land, while parcels of 0.1-2 hectares 
had been given to each household for production purposes. Responses varied as to the income 
generated from planting protective trees, but on average households could earn around US$30 per 
hectare per year from this activity. Since few households had harvested during 2006, it was not 
possible to estimate profits from production forestry. In addition, 5% of respondents – all from Tan 
Lang commune - had been involved in the “5 million hectare reforestation programme” 
(Programme 661) also for both forest production and protection purposes and 12% of the 
respondents had received tree species to plant through the FARM project.  
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Despite the wide variety of tree species planted by households, including teak, bamboo, eucalyptus, 
cinnamon, longan, melia, and acacia, the forestry programs implemented in Phu Yen have not been 
successful. Only one household can be considered an exception: holding a large area of forestry 
land of over ten hectares, attained through both the FARM project and Program 747, this household 
managed a complex system of timber production, wood for household use, agro-forestry with maize 
and cassava, and a grazing area for buffaloes. According to statements made by the household 
respondent these entitlements generated significant profits. Also, two households in Tan Lang had 
made self-investments in forestry, planting Melia trees on their land for selling. In general, 
however, the majority of households did not consider having forestry land as a successful venture. 
Moreover, the forestry programs and land allocation are pertinent examples of the external 
conditions imposed upon communities that often create confusion and contribute to unexpected 
outcomes of intervention, as exemplified in the case studies from the last chapter. 
4.2.2.3. CARE in Phu Yen: FARM and the COS component 
CAREs involvement in Phu Yen district started in 1992 as a result of discussions with the 
Provincial People‟s Committee concerning the detrimental effects on livelihoods and the 
environment following the building of the Hoa Binh hydro-electric dam. After a feasibility study, a 
2½ year pilot project was undertaken in 1994 which focused on immediate improvements to 
farmers‟ livelihoods such as provision of agricultural inputs in connection with training in farming 
techniques (CARE, 2004b: 1) that were deemed „appropriate‟ by CARE.  
After the pilot phase, the Phu Yen Farmers Action for Resource Management (FARM) project was 
designed and implemented, beginning in 1997. The primary aim of FARM was to develop 
sustainable livelihood strategies for farming households as a means to reduce environmental 
degradation. The planned intervention covered a number of areas including tree-planting, forestry, 
forest protection, water engineering, agriculture, animal husbandry, credit, and community 
development (CARE, 2004b: 2). One of the activities carried out was the dissemination of three 
different sloping agricultural land techniques (SALT), intended to reduce soil erosion. Additional 
project activities included introduction of alternative income-generating activities, such as 
cultivation of HYV, fish ponds, and animal husbandry (Folving, 2007). The project also created 
community-based organisations in all villages included in project activities, called Village 
Development Boards (VDBs), whose main function were to increase household incomes and 
alleviate poverty. The rationale for establishing VDBs at the outset of the project was to ensure that 
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all project activities were carried out in a transparent and participatory manner (CARE, 2004b: 3). 
A Village Development Fund was set up in each village which consisted of contributions from 
villagers as part of their involvement in FARM activities. It was also expected that the VDBs would 
cooperate with local authorities and take up development activities within the villages. However, 
this only happened in a few villages and both commune- and district level authorities did not 
formally recognise the VDBs (CARE, 2004b: 4). After a midterm review in 2000 it was decided 
that the institutional capacity of CBOs and district partners needed strengthening and the project 
was extended for two years. The final evaluation came in 2003, when it was determined that while 
the project had followed its implementation strategy and had achieved its objectives, some issues 
still needed further attention (CARE, 2004b: 2). This included addressing the lack of adoption of 
SALT by farmers and the weak capacity of the VDBs. This prompted the design of the COS 
component of the CASI programme, as a follow-up to FARM.  
The Community Organization Strengthening (COS) project was approved and implemented in 2004 
as a component of the CASI-program phase II and as a post-project activity of FARM. The 
component was created to ensure the sustainability of certain activities implemented as part of the 
FARM-project, focusing on three objectives that needed further attention according to the final 
evaluation. These objectives were the improvement of community development, increasing gender 
awareness and promotion of sloping agricultural land techniques (SALT) in the same nine 
communes that had been selected for the FARM project. It was intended that these three objectives 
should contribute to achieving the overall objective of strengthening capacity of the existing VDBs 
to identify their own needs, including the interests of the poor, women, and ethnic minorities, 
through village development planning processes (CARE, 2004b: 1).  
Like FARM, the implementation of COS was characterised by strong involvement by the 
government and State agencies played a significant role in carrying out activities. At the outset 
CARE in Vietnam and the District People‟s Committee shared responsibility for the management of 
the component together with three Vietnamese NGOs that each specialised in activities related to 
the three main objectives (community development, gender awareness, and SALT). The project was 
thus co-managed by CAREs project manager and a government official from the district.  
All three of the initial Vietnamese NGOs pulled out of the component and were later replaced. Eco-
Eco, the NGO experienced with SALT, was the first of these, though CARE kept one of its staff 
members and recruited him as a project officer in charge of SALT activities for the COS 
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component. Subsequently, SALT activities would instead be carried out in collaboration with two 
State agencies, the Agricultural Extension Station (AES) and the Department of Agricultural and 
Rural Development. The Center for Community Development and The Center for Advanced 
Capacity Support and Community Cooperation, NGOs with experience in community development 
projects, worked with AES and DARD as well as the Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) 
on community development planning. The same two NGOs also collaborated with the Phu Yen 
Educational Department and the Women‟s Union on gender awareness activities (CARE, 2004b: 
11; CARE, 2006: 7). Staff from the Economic Department of Phu Yen was also involved in 
activities related to the community development objective (CARE, 2006). Finally all village 
development plans had to be sent to the DPI for approval (CARE, 2004b: 13).  
Since the component was co-managed by the district authorities, and several government 
departments and agencies were involved, CAREs authority over project activities was 
comparatively limited. In addition, the lack of formal recognition of the VDBs by commune and 
district authorities posed a significant challenge for the COS component since the successful agency 
of the VDBs were considered the main engine for improving livelihoods.   
4.2.2.4. The operational space of CARE International in Phu Yen 
The first section of the analysis detailed some of the difficulties and unanticipated responses faced 
by government officials and staff when implementing programs and projects that are created by 
central decision-making institutions in Hanoi that adhere to rigid, national laws. The fact that these 
programs are often ineffectively implemented at the local level causes a lack of credence and may 
exacerbate the situation resulting in many unintended effects.  
The villagers identified as the target group in the COS project had also been included in government 
programs as well as in the FARM project. The many forestry programs and the FARM project‟s 
tree-planting and SALT initiatives had met with little success in the district. One of the main 
reasons for implementing the COS project was to properly disseminate SALT which had more or 
less failed during FARM.  
The Phu Yen case study illustrates the limited operational space that International NGOs have. 
CAREs main target groups have dealt with outside intervention on numerous occasions in the past, 
while implementation with strong government involvement reduces the possibilities for genuine 
participatory development. This is because the lifeworlds of target groups differ substantially from 
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those of government institutions. CARE had argued that co-management of COS with the district 
authorities and agencies would be beneficial due to the resources that both parties had invested in 
FARM (CARE, 2004b: 4)). However, one could also argue that working closely with the 
government could produce responses of hesitation or apprehension on the part of villagers as a 
result of their lived-in experiences with government intervention. 
The complexities and multiple realities that exist in a the social interface of local level 
implementation of government policy, exemplified in the three case studies in the previous section, 
illustrate the conditions that international NGOs face when planning intervention in rural 
mountainous areas of Vietnam. These complexities can involve the uncooperative stance of local 
communities and households to external intervention, poor cooperation between district authorities 
and local government, lack of enforcement of regulations by local government, the tendency to 
bend or break rules and regulations, social differentiation, and lack of cooperation between 
households. Therefore, when NGOs carry out planned intervention there is great potential for 
unintended effects and unforeseen responses, which would argue against the use of an LFA for such 
planned intervention. This, however, may prove to be difficult since most major international NGOs 
are highly donor-driven, which entails that project activities and expected outcomes should be 
presented to these donors as early as possible in order to justify funding. 
As noted in chapter 3, there is a tendency to view rural communities, where traditional lifestyles and 
agriculture persists, as being homogenous, harmonious, socially cohesive societies. As noted 
previously, the perception is that the right amount of local participation or PRA and technology 
packages will lift these communities out of poverty. The case studies illustrate that reality is much 
more complex, and that individual households often follow their own specific livelihood strategies, 
whether they are migration, diversification, intensification, or bursts of resource overexploitation, in 
order to generate entitlements and maximise capabilities. Furthermore, frequent external 
intervention has actually contributed to a lack of human and social capital in some cases, such as the 
case study of the Da Bac Tày illustrated. Villagers in Phu Yen district have also been heavily 
influenced by external forces, at least since the construction of the Hoa Binh dam started in the late 
1980s, which may have had an influence on their human capital endowments and ability to take 
individual initiative. Even in cases where cohesive or homogenous communities exist, there has 
sometimes been fierce resistance towards external influence if it has conflicted with traditional or 
customary management structures. 
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4.2.3. Means of intervention  
This section describes the means of intervention used by international NGOs, and focuses mainly 
on project-created CBOs and dissemination of SALT in Phu Yen district. Implementation of SALT 
has been used as a development initiative in many other locations; this chapter includes two other 
examples.  
The scope of the COS component included 86 villages included in the original nine FARM project 
communes. The target groups identified by CARE included the 300 members of VDBs who would 
be trained in community development theory, management, village planning, gender awareness, 
communication, and SALT. In addition, the main beneficiaries would be the 500 households that 
were chosen to pilot SALT activities, 5000 men and women who would benefit from training, 
cross-visits, and workshops on community development issues, gender issues, and SALT, as well as 
2000 women who would benefit from new stoves and literacy classes. 
4.2.3.1. Village Development Boards in Phu Yen 
The same VDBs created during FARM were included in the activities of the COS component. Since 
the final evaluation of FARM had indicated that the VDBs lacked capacity and that few were 
carrying out their tasks, CARE modified its approach. The plan was to strengthen linkages between 
the VDBs and local authorities while maintaining their autonomy. Village Development Board 
Clubs (VDBCs) were therefore established at the commune level in all nine communes involved in 
FARM and COS. The leadership of these clubs are often dominated by members of local 
government. The typical club would consist of 15-20 members from the VDBs (CARE, 2004b) in 
addition to the head of the club, often being the chairman or vice-chairman of the CPC, and the 
vice-head of the club, who is often the chairman of the local chapter of a mass organisation such as 
the Women‟s Union (CARE, 2006: 17).  
The village development planning processes used an approach based on a „village vision‟, which 
entails that villagers participate in identifying expectations for the future of the village in addition to 
their demands, needs, and interests (CARE, 2004b: 12). CARE used a training-of-trainers approach: 
members of the VDBCs would train members of the VDBs, who would implement activities such 
as revising their current structure and job descriptions of members, improving channels of 
communication, and improving women‟s involvement in decision-making. All these activities were 
carried out with facilitation from CARE and VNGO staff. The main activity of the entire 
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component, called Village Development Planning, was elaborate PRA sessions in all 86 villages 
during the spring of 2006 that were carried out by staff from CARE, AES, the VNGOs, and the 
Economic Department in collaboration with the VDBs. The potential for VDBs to benefit from the 
strategic agency of outside intervention in the future - in cases of lacking financial or technical 
capacity - was also included in the project. 
The „village‟ vision fits well with that of other NGOs who maintain the belief that with minimal 
external support, CBOs will be able to organise themselves and work together with district 
authorities and agencies resulting in an improvement of livelihoods. However, past experiences in 
the Phu Yen district - for example with FARM - has shown that the villages are not necessarily 
homogenous entities easily capable of social organisation. The cohesiveness of communities in the 
project area was most certainly disrupted to some extent as a consequence of the Hoa Binh Dam 
construction and the ensuing migration and resettlement to upland areas in many villages in the 
project area.  
4.2.3.2. Outcome of implementation of VDBs 
 According to CAREs COS evaluation, carried out in the fall of 2006, the component‟s objective of 
capacity building had been achieved. VDB members were considered able to arrange and facilitate 
community work and meetings in a participatory manner. According to members of VDBs targeting 
the poor, women, and ethnic minorities remained a priority for them. Households in five sample 
villages had been interviewed about the performance of the VDBs and most replies were favourable 
towards the VDBs. However, according to replies only two out of five VDBs were always targeting 
the poor and women in their activities. One commune, inhabited mainly by Dao people, was 
highlighted as being the most successful. In that commune the VDBC had facilitated and organised 
a lot of community-based activities, which were independent of COS work plans (CARE, 2006: 7).  
During the field work, VDB members were interviewed concerning the financial and technical 
support they would be able to give farmers in the future. One VDBC member in Tuong Ha claimed 
not to think much about the future and her role as member of the VDB or VDBC. She pointed out 
that lack of capital was the main difficulty in sustaining SALT-practices. She did, however, hope 
for support from the AES to buy seeds and fertilizer as well as sows for expansion of sow-raising 
activities. Another VDBC member seemed much more ambitious and wanted to use his role in the 
VDB to recommend and promote sub-terracing on upland fields in his village. Contour furrows had 
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been implemented, but he felt that sub-terracing would be an easier, more convenient and suitable 
model to the conditions in his village. One chairman of a VDB in Tan Lang said he invites 20-30 
households to see his SALT model every time he prepares his land. He says that he arranges 
monthly meetings with the Communes People‟s Committee (CPC) to discuss plans for expansion of 
SALT and that this cooperation is working very well. The CPC vice-chairman and chairman of the 
VDBC confirms this, saying he collects the demands of the villagers and holds monthly meetings 
with them to discuss their needs. He claims that villagers are concerned about the lack of both 
capital and labour, especially for cultivation on steep slopes. In his opinion the best way to 
overcome these difficulties is to attract more capital from organizations such as CARE in order to 
create new projects aimed at expanding SALT-activities. One member of the VDB who was also 
selected as a model farmer, claimed that one of the most important benefits of SALT is that the 
financial support for inputs from COS, have allowed his household to generate savings for future 
purchases. 
The above indicates that the involvement and dedication of VDB members varies, and some 
members are perhaps more concerned with how their membership will affect capital endowments 
for their own household. On the other hand, other members clearly show initiative and dedication to 
achieving agricultural development for the community. 
Interviews with model farmers also revealed that there were high expectations of the VDBs. Around 
80% of model farmers replied that they would need technical support for their SALT activities in 
the future. When asked who they would contact if they had problems with their SALT-model, most 
respondents said they would ask either a VDB member or an extension worker, though many 
replied they would usually go to a VDB member first to discuss problems. One respondent said he 
usually visited a VDB member 3 times a month.  
4.2.3.3. SALT 
SALT was originally designed in the Philippines as a technology package of both soil conservation 
and food production for upland households which has since become widespread in Southeast Asia 
(Watson, 1995; Palmer et al, 1999; cited by Folving: 4). SALT aims at erosion control, 
improvement of soil fertility, and provision of adequate food and income for farmers (Palmers et al., 
1999; cited by Folving, 2007: 4). According to a study from the Philippines, farmers‟ incomes were 
greatly increased already in the first two years after applying a SALT model. The farmers in the 
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study area used their own labour and had very few or no other income sources (Watson, 1995). This 
is comparable to the Phu Yen district where most rural households rely almost exclusively on 
upland cash cropping as sources of income. 
Despite the widespread use of SALT as an intervention tool in rural areas, there are many examples 
of failed attempts to successfully implement SALT in Vietnam. One such case was a project called 
„The Ngoc Lac natural resource management and conservation project‟ which was implemented by 
CARE International and funded by the Norwegian government in Ngoc Lac district in Thanh Hoa 
province, North-Central Vietnam. Four communes in the district – inhabited by Muong and Kinh 
people – were included in project activities (Peters, 2001). According to Peters (2001) the PRA 
sessions conducted as part of a baseline survey over a period of three weeks were characterised by 
limited data collection, lacking wealth ranking, proper identification of ethnicity of villagers, and 
lack of attention to gender issues (Peters, 2001: 405). The impression was that all activities were 
planned before the baseline survey was conducted, illustrated by the fact that pre-determined 
categories were used for PRA sessions. In addition, at no time were villagers consulted about their 
upland farming systems, a major focus of the project (Peters, 2001: 405).  
Both VDBs and SALT models were introduced as part of agricultural intervention activities, but 
many problems with the implementation was identified, namely that the project had adopted a 
highly subsidized approach to introduction of SALT models, model households were only provided 
short training as well as being given seeds for leguminous plants, fruit trees, and maize to plant on 
their upland fields, and the model households selected were often heads of VDBs or related to these 
(Peters, 2001: 405-406). The result was that only 43% of the models were correctly applied, and in 
the follow-up survey less than ten households had maintained SALT models on their land (Peters, 
2001: 405).  
SALT models were also introduced in Northern Vietnam as part of the Mountain Rural 
Development Programme (MRDP) - a broad-scoped project funded by SIDA - between 1997 and 
2000. The SALT models introduced were part of a „technological package‟ approach the MRDP 
had developed with DARD. Following an evaluation in 1999, the SALT model approach was 
deemed too simplistic and inappropriate in many cases and it was urged that the issue of developing 
sloping agriculture be reassessed (Gibbon and Yen, 1999). The main findings were that SALT 
models could not be applied indiscriminately on any slope, that the rationale of farmers for growing 
crops on sloping land was not well-known, and that there was a need to examine more closely the 
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vast literature on SALT and similar farming techniques. The suitability of this approach in upland 
areas was also questioned in the evaluation. One issue related to this model approach that was 
singled out was the fact that the intervening organisation had given strict criteria for farmer 
participation including the requirement to follow the technical specification of the model, to 
contribute labour, materials, and tools as well as having favourable land conditions for 
implementation (Gibbon and Yen, 1999). Despite these failed attempts, given the right conditions, 
SALT has produced remarkable results in reducing soil erosion and generating entitlements for poor 
households.  
4.2.3.4. Potential benefits of SALT 
SALT has the dual purpose of protecting the soil against erosion and improving and diversifying 
production. SALT models included in the FARM project were bench terracing, hedgerows, fruit and 
timber tree planting, and intercropping with perennials (Folving, 2007: 6). According to CARE 
staff, the SALT models used in the COS component communes were more specifically designed 
and suited to the conditions of their location and were combinations of the following practices: 
Furrows on contour lines, rock terracing on contour lines, terracing, sub-terracing, planting of deep-
rooted, leguminous plants such as Leucaena and Tephrosia, planting of pineapple plants on contour 
lines, planting of grasses on contour lines, and intercropping. 
A study from the Philippines showed that over a six-year period, the mean soil loss on SALT-fields 
was 3.4 t/ha compared to a mean soil loss of 194.3 t/ha on non-SALT fields (Laquihon & Pagbilao, 
1998). However it is highly questionable as to whether or not the conditions and the models used in 
that location correspond to those in Phu Yen. The models applied in Phu Yen were required a 
significant amount of labour. Contour furrows are dug on fields with slopes of 20-40°, retaining 
both soil and water on the field while rock terracing is practiced on land where terracing is not 
possible, due to the presence of large rocks. These rocks are used to build rock walls for erosion 
control. Terraces are built on land that has slopes of 15-20° while sub-terraces are encouraged on 
very steep slopes. On fields with slopes exceeding 45°, the green hedgerow technique can be 
applied for the best results (SALT training manual). All models used by farmers combine the above 
practices with planting of protective trees (Leucaena and Tephrosia), pineapple plants, grasses 
(Ghine grass and Suoi Chieu) or wild peanut on contour lines. The protective trees and wild peanut 
serve a dual-purpose of erosion control and nitrogen fixation. Grasses and pineapple plants also 
reduce erosion. Wild peanut inter-cropped with cash crops provides plant cover, protecting the soil 
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from rainfall and subsequent erosion, and the crop‟s residues, when incorporated, contributes 
organic matter and nitrogen to the soil.  
Studies from the Philippines conducted by the Mindanao Baptist Rural Life Center have shown that 
establishment of SALT requires a relatively higher amount of labour as compared with traditional 
cultivation. However, when averaged over a longer period of time, cultivation using SALT may 
involve less labour due to the build-up of rich organic mulch from trimming of shrubs and 
hedgerows, which prevent weed growth and thus the need for weeding. SALT application may also 
result in a decrease in the area for planting annual crops, due to the area needed for establishment of 
furrows, rock terraces or terraces as well as the planting of protective trees. This should also reduce 
the necessary labor input in the long-term as well (Laquihon & Pagbilao, 1998), though this is 
without taking possible maintenance costs into account.  
Aside from erosion control and enriching the soil, the protective trees that are planted on contour 
lines also have the potential to generate worthwhile entitlements given the right conditions. Lucaena 
shrubs can benefit the household economy by being used as animal fodder, as hardwood for fuel or 
small furniture, for production of necklaces from seeds, and the seeds and young leaves can be used 
as vegetables for human consumption (Shelton & Brewbaker, 1998). Pineapple can be harvested 
each year and used for subsistence or sold while the grass species can also be used for animal 
fodder.  
4.2.3.5. Outcome of implementation of SALT in Phu Yen 
The FARM project promoted a move away from villagers‟ reliance on shifting cultivation systems 
towards a diversification livelihood strategy. As part of this strategy, villagers were encouraged to 
adopt SALT (Folving, 2007). A total of 1197 out of 1326 households planted hedgerows on 258 
hectares of land after being trained in the technique (CARE, 2004b).  
A study was conducted in 2000 (Folving, 2007) of two villages where SALT models had been 
implemented as part of the FARM project. One village was inhabited by Muong and Thai ethnic 
groups that traditionally used a composite swiddening farming system. The other village was 
inhabited entirely by Dao households, who practiced a more pure form of swiddening (Folving, 
2007: 45). The former village was in the process of diversifying their farming system and had the 
highest potential level of SALT adoption: 56% of farmers expressed interest in fruit trees, 47% in 
bench terraces, and 20% in hedgerows (Folving, 2007: 53). However, many farmers were also 
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critical, claiming that the models were too expensive, required too much land and labour, and were 
too complicated. In addition, the time spent travelling to fields located far from the residential area, 
in order to construct and maintain labour-intensive SALT models also discouraged farmers from 
adopting the techniques (Folving, 2007: 55). None of the households in the Dao-inhabited village 
intended to implement SALT in the future except for fruit trees. The only households that were 
implementing SALT were model farmers who had participated in training sessions (Folving, 2007: 
55) arranged by FARM. These households were also the wealthiest and best-educated in the village. 
The Dao villagers‟ main concern was the problems they faced in selling their fruits and pigs. These 
problems were both due to lack of physical infrastructure and market access, and also cultural and 
language barriers (Folving 2007: 55). 
Overall, hedgerows and cover cropping failed to be adopted by farmers in the project communes. 
Farmers found the hedgerow technique to be ill-suited for steep land. The steep land caused the 
width between rows to become narrow, which left little room for crops. Furthermore, the hedgerows 
also shaded for the crops which affected their yields (CARE, 2004b: 2). As in the example above, 
farmers complained about the labour costs for maintaining the hedgerows. None of the farmers 
adopted cover cropping, which requires planting leguminous plants alongside crops, in order to 
enrich the soil with nitrogen. This technique takes several years to realise and farmers could not see 
any direct benefit from using it. Though terracing was the preferred technique, a relatively small 
number of households adopted the technique. The reasons for this, according to farmers, were that 
the farming land was too steep and the techniques too labour intensive. In addition, terraces were 
often affected by water damage, causing erosion and damage to crops. (CARE, 2004b: 3) 
Since SALT activities had not been successful in the FARM project, new techniques were 
introduced, and model households selected according to new criteria formulated by CARE. The 
selection of model households depended on their willingness to participate in SALT-activities and 
to learn new technology. The area had to be sufficiently large enough area for implementing a 
SALT model, requiring 2.5 ha for one model. Since so many households – especially the poorest, 
who often had the least amount of land - were not able to meet that requirement, one model could 
include several households. The fields should also be conveniently located for non-participating 
households to be able to observe the SALT-model. According to the CARE criteria, the required 
labour for SALT establishment was at least two people and the participating household had to either 
meet this demand or be able to afford to hire labour. Finally, at least 70% of the participating model 
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households had to be the poorest households in the villages. However, some of the model farmers 
interviewed during field work were also members of VDBs and village leaders, casting some 
suspicion on whether or not the poverty criteria was upheld. 
Implementation was carried out using a Training of Trainers approach. CARE staff trained 
extension workers from the AES in SALT. The extension workers, in turn trained both members of 
VDBCs at the commune level and VDB members at the village level, with additional training and 
monitoring activities carried out by technical experts from the COS-staff. A typical training session 
included both three hours theoretical lessons on the importance of soil conservation measures as 
well as three hours of on-field training in SALT-model establishment. Personal observations made 
during one of the training courses indicated that the participants were far less engaged during the 
theoretical training than during the on-field practice. The intent was that the theoretical training 
should be participatory, but the extension worker was almost the only person speaking during these 
training sessions. Furthermore, cross-visits to SALT-model sites were arranged for villagers who 
are not applying SALT. 
One of the main partners in the COS-component involved in SALT implementation was the 
Agricultural Extension Station (AES) in the Phu Yen district. According to the leader of the 
Agricultural Extension Station (AES), the tasks and responsibilities of the AES included improving 
profits and developing production for farming households in Phu Yen district. This was done 
mainly through transferral of agricultural techniques which aim to increase yields of crops and 
improve animal husbandry techniques. The station worked with numerous Government departments 
and mass organizations including the Economic Department, Rice Seed Department, Farmers‟ 
Union, Women‟s Union, Invalids Union and the Youth Union. The work of the station was also 
carried out through government programs and in collaboration with NGOs such as CARE 
International and their partners. The AES had provided extension workers in all COS-communes for 
participation in the component and had provided one staff member who could work full-time for 
COS. Aside from conducting courses and giving advice the extension workers also collect ideas and 
information from the villagers and make reports on all land use activities in the commune including 
forestry, agriculture and animal husbandry.  
Difficulties in disseminating SALT-models in the project area were expressed by the AES staff. The 
main problems were that fishing was an important short term income source in many villages and 
that the villagers do not understand the long-term benefits of SALT. Furthermore, villagers claim 
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that sloping land is very difficult and time-consuming to cultivate. One extension worker elaborated 
on these issues, claiming that the villagers had many needs that the COS-component could not 
afford, that the extension staff needed more time to prepare training courses, that there were 
misunderstandings and miscommunication between him and the leader of the AES and that some 
plans were not quite clear. Furthermore, the staff member claimed that the selection of households 
for SALT activities was difficult because some households disagree with the criteria for selection, 
especially concerning their poverty status. Finally – according to the staff member - many 
households stopped participating after volunteering and attending one training course, again mainly 
due to the higher income possible from fishing, personal obligations, the distance from their home 
to their upland fields, and because of crop failure due to erratic weather in 2005. Another extension 
worker said that the biggest difficulty in the future would be that the villagers had to buy all inputs 
themselves and that they would not receive any labour support. In addition, he claimed that 
financial capital would be the main obstacle for independent implementation of SALT.  
The AES workers were dedicated and often hard-working. However, they also indicated that the 
lifeworlds of villagers were not compatible with SALT models and that villagers would continue to 
rely on their own livelihood strategies.  
4.2.3.6. Adoption and sustainability of SALT 
Farmers who had implemented SALT claimed that they would need to obtain loans for SALT-
activities in the future. Most farmers at the time already depended on loans or credits for inputs. 
One respondent claimed he would try to obtain loans to cover the expenses for protective trees from 
either the State Bank or the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), otherwise from a 
development project. Another respondent had taken loans for buying a motorbike and pigs from the 
State Bank. He intended to obtain loans for continued expansion of SALT after the COS component 
ended, also from the State Bank or from neighbours in the village. One respondent said he would 
contact the chairman of the village for support. Most respondents claimed that the need for loans 
would depend on the income from cash crops. If the yields and consequently the income were 
sufficiently high, there would not be a need for obtaining loans.  
A number of respondents had already borrowed money from the VBSP mainly for purchase of 
animals. A bad harvest in 2005 in both Tuong Ha and Tuong Phong, caused a number of villagers 
to sell their animals and spend the borrowed money on rice and other necessities, instead of 
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investing them in production. Many had not paid these loans back and a number of households 
interviewed during field work had debt problems, as mentioned previously.  
The VBSP has a number of strict demands of loan recipients, namely that they must be categorized 
as „poor‟ by the government‟s standards and that households have at least one member enrolled in a 
mass organization. Furthermore, if household members are considered „lazy‟, commit social evils, 
disobey government policy or are already in debt with the bank they cannot be eligible for loans 
from the bank. The loans and credit the VBSP handles usually have an interest rate of 0.5% pr. 
month, though it may vary depending on the lifetime of the loan, which ranges from 1 to 5 years, 
and the location of the borrowing households‟ residence. The interest rates are more favourable for 
more remote areas. The recipients must use the money to improve their livelihoods and it is the 
supervisor‟s responsibility to ensure this.  
According to an interview with the manager of the VBSP in 2006, the loans that were given were 
usually for animal husbandry purposes and the VBSP had not yet heard of the SALT-models in Phu 
Yen. Nor had they received any applications to obtain loans/credits for this purpose. The VDBs had 
thus not made any attempt to organise loan applications for households willing to invest in SALT.  
Farmers had not yet seen any direct financial benefits to the household economy from their SALT 
models. Though COS-supported farmers in Tan Lang, which was the first commune to establish 
SALT-models, had achieved higher yields and income from upland cash crops than non-supported 
farmers, the differences were slight and how this difference relates to the establishment of SALT is 
questionable. In addition, the majority of respondents to the questionnaire claimed that a larger 
labour input was necessary for SALT-establishment than when using traditional cultivation 
methods. Lack of household labour was also cited as a reason for not adopting SALT. 
The field work found that 25% of all non-model households that were interviewed with the 
questionnaire were replicating a SALT-model. All these farmers were found in Tuong Phong and 
Tan Lang communes. According to questionnaire responses and interviews, 90% of all farmers 
considered soil erosion a major problem on their land, which they partly attributed to a lack of 
farming techniques. However, many villagers considered SALT complicated and labour-intensive. 
Some households only had two able adults to work on upland fields, which made it nearly 
impossible to implement SALT.  Villagers considered rock terracing the easiest model to apply. 
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According to their views, the use of rocks to prevent soil erosion leaves more space for planting 
cash crops, making land preparation easier, and reducing the need for weeding. 
None of the replicating farmers had planted protective trees, except one farmer who had planted 
hibiscus on his own initiative. These farmers did not know where to obtain seeds and seedlings for 
protective trees because they were only given to model farmers. Model farmers were required to set 
up seed banks on their fields, so replicating farmers could obtain seeds for protective trees. This 
system seemed to rely exclusively on the goodwill of model farmers. Establishing a seed bank takes 
2-3 years and despite the presence of replicating farmers, none of these banks had been established. 
It is possible that model farmers will attempt to capitalize on the Lucaena seed banks, by selling 
seeds to replicating farmers.  
The remaining farmers were not replicating because of lack of household labour, being unable to 
hire labour, poor understanding of the techniques, lack of land to cultivate, and lack of capital. 
Some respondents claimed that they would apply SALT if their situation changed to make it 
possible.  
Of the model farmers, 51% said they were teaching other households about SALT. This was a 
substantial number of farmers who were taking the time to disseminate the techniques despite the 
low level of adoption. Some replicating farmers were also sharing knowledge about SALT. The 
remaining model respondents were more sceptical and claim that other households are not 
interested in adopting the techniques indicating a sense of community fragmentation where SALT 
farmers distance themselves from the remaining households.  
4.2.3.7. Unintended effects of SALT intervention 
Despite the inclusion of risks and assumptions in the LFA matrix developed for the COS 
component, there are many more direct and potential, unintended effects of the intervention.  
Firstly, model farmers were given HYV seeds of maize and soybean, both during FARM and COS. 
These are increasingly used and are also available through other sources in the district. The 
prevalence of these HYV being used by farmers could create difficulties in the future, such as a 
reliance on the seeds, the loss of traditional maize varieties, increasing pest incidence and the 
consequent reliance on pesticides to combat insects and weeds. If left unchecked, these issues could 
affect both the financial and environmental sustainability. 
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Secondly, an important aspect is the risk of increasing inequality within the villages as a result of 
SALT intervention. COS model farmers were supported with labour, seeds, fertilizer, and protective 
trees in order to establish their SALT models. According to one model farmer, in line with the VDB 
member, claimed that the support for inputs from COS, have allowed his household to save up 
money. A replicating farmer does not have the same starting point and it is doubtful that the VDBs 
would be able to prevent this type of exploitation. 
Lastly, confusion still exists about farmers‟ land use rights, especially in Tuong Ha commune where 
75% of questionnaire respondents did not know how many years they are allowed to use their 
upland fields. CARE had not taken this into account, even though investment in sustainable land 
use is a central feature of the organisation‟s vision. 
4.2.4. Discussion  
The State forestry programmes that have reached villagers in the three communes have met with 
little success. Only one household has used abundant forestry land to great effect and manages a 
complex system including timber production, production of wood for household use, agro-forestry, 
and a grazing area for buffaloes. However, this isolated example does not indicate that the 
intervention can be considered replicable. Rather, it is an indication that the household has used 
human and natural capital endowments and seized upon the opportunity offered by State agencies, 
incorporating forestry as part of strategic decision-making and livelihood strategies of the 
household, to generate entitlements in order to maximise capabilities.  
This section has mainly investigated the effects of intervention carried out by NGOs in the Phu Yen 
district. The question is whether these intervention efforts have enabled target groups to maximise 
their capabilities and direct them towards achieving sustainable livelihoods.  
Firstly, it seems that – in the case of Phu Yen – customary tenure systems existed before the FARM 
project. How developed these systems are, is not well-known. Neither is the number of villages that 
have these informal institutions in place. However, this issue should have been included in the 
baseline research and LFAs created by CARE, especially when creating new CBOs as part of 
project activities. The presence of informal institutions poses a challenge to the adoption of SALT.  
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Another omission from CAREs list of assumptions is the importance of maize for animal fodder 
used in the Red River Delta. It seems odd that such a worthwhile economic venture for farmers in 
Phu Yen has not been developed further by the intervening partners. 
The involvement and nature of partnerships with VNGOs should perhaps also be re-evaluated since 
partnerships with three VNGOs were terminated in starting phase of the COS project.   
It seems that mistakes from the past are being repeated in the way SALT has been implemented in 
Phu Yen. A highly subsidized approach to introduction of SALT model has been used. Also, the 
strict criteria for participating makes it difficult for most households to implement the models 
properly which may be connected to the fact that many model farmers are not the poorest in the 
district. 
SALT has the potential to generate a number of potential entitlements for households, but the 
suitability for large-scale implementation such as in FARM and COS remains questionable. It 
seems that some farmers, whose livelihood strategies and capital endowments of land, labour, and 
skills are compatible with using SALT are willing to adopt. In general, however, few are willing 
due to lack of human, financial, and natural capital, and prefer to follow their own livelihood 
strategies relying on other, well-known activities such as fishing.  
As it is now, the main beneficiaries of SALT activities have been model farmers, who have 
benefited from an arguably excessive amount of external support. Lack of labour, financial capital, 
time, and land are keeping most farmers from adopting SALT, and therefore SALT cannot be 
considered the means to achieve sustainable livelihoods in Phu Yen district. 
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5. Conclusion 
The results and discussion of the analysis show that small-scale farming households will seek to 
maximise their capabilities with the capital endowments they possess. In this process, they are 
enabled or constrained by other actors and institutions. Institutions especially – whether formal or 
informal – mediate these complex processes. It is therefore necessary to identify the main actors and 
institutions, and how they interact, struggle, and negotiate over issues related to natural resource 
management, since it has a profound effect on the entitlements that are generated for the average 
household. 
Arguably, the Vietnamese government has formulated policies and implemented programs aimed at 
developing ethnic minority communities with the intention to include them in the country‟s 
economic growth. However, these have often been rendered ineffective through poor 
implementation, weak linkages between administrative levels, and lack of knowledge about local 
conditions and target groups. In some ethnic minority communities informal institutions exist that 
have created a strong cohesiveness among villagers and maintained sustainable land tenure regimes. 
These communities have in some cases been able to modify national laws, allowing them to 
incorporate elements of these intervention initiatives in their livelihood strategies for their own 
benefit. In addition, these communities have often been characterised by a low frequency of 
external influence or intervention throughout their history.  
The complexity and „multiple realities‟ found in these social interfaces, as illustrated by the case 
studies concerning government policy, has a profound effect on international NGOs that plan rural 
development projects in the same regions. These NGOs are constrained in their operational space 
by government institutions, whose direct involvement in project activities may significantly 
influence the implementation of the project. The operational space is also influenced by the 
intended target group communities where lifeworlds may have been influenced by frequent 
government intervention or where strong informal institutions may exist that will seek to modify 
intervention imposed by external forces. The case study in Phu Yen is a pertinent example of this 
situation and in many ways SALT – as the central means of intervention – can be described as an 
attempt to accommodate to both government policy and villagers‟ traditional farming systems much 
like CARE itself. SALT is used as a means for farmers to move away from traditional shifting 
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cultivation towards intensive, sedentary agriculture. However, at the same time it also promotes 
diversification and a lower external input agriculture than what the government normally would 
prescribe. 
SALT and the VDBs are also representative of the means of intervention often employed by rural 
service-delivery NGOs. The „package‟ or „model‟ approach is still the preferred intervention tool, 
often combined with project-created community based organisations as the institutional frame for 
the management of village resources. In addition, farmers chosen to demonstrate the technology 
contained within these models are the ones NGOs consider „resourceful‟, „innovative‟, or the most 
„receptive to change‟. Unfortunately, these farmers – who receive significant support and benefits 
from the NGO – are rarely among the poorest or most natural resource-dependent.  
One assumption about made about the model approach is that training-of-trainers will result in 
successful replication of technology through the willingness of VDB members and model farmers. 
Secondly, this willingness to participate in community development and the training of fellow 
villagers is based on the image of the community as being homogenous, cohesive, and able to 
manage natural resources with appropriate but modest support from the outside. The outcome of 
both FARM and COS has shown that the lifeworlds of target groups and beneficiaries do not 
always correspond to this image. International NGOs should therefore consider re-evaluating and 
re-assessing their approaches to intervention in rural, mountainous area. 
Based on the government programs and NGO projects analysed in this thesis, planned intervention 
mostly benefits households that already possess significant human and social capital and are able to 
benefit from it by strategically incorporating elements in existing livelihood strategies. Many other 
actors are constrained by intervention as a result of dependency on consumer goods, inputs, 
technology for intensive farming, as well as issues of inequality and debt. Behind these constraining 
factors lies the central issue which entails that the conflicting lifeworlds between villagers in rural 
highland areas and the Vietnamese State are the result of deep-rooted, persisting, and irreconcilable 
ways of viewing upland areas and what they should be used for. In addition to re-assessing the 
implementation of their service-delivery activities, international NGOs should be more active in 
mediating and reconciling these opposing lifeworlds by putting more emphasis on influencing 
policies in Vietnam.  
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As a theoretical framework for this thesis the combination of environmental entitlements theory and 
the sustainable rural livelihoods framework provided an appropriate methodological approach for 
examining the complexities of planned intervention. In addition, the actor-oriented approach 
allowed a useful simplification of the realities of planned intervention in which endowments and 
entitlements generate capabilities that may or may not result in the successful pursuit of sustainable 
livelihoods.  
The field methods produced data and results mainly for a specific survey conducted during an 
internship. However, the wealth of data generated was sufficient for a more in-depth examination of 
NGO intervention. In order to produce a fuller investigation, a number of key informant interviews 
would have strengthened the analysis. This mainly concerns interviews with district officials from 
some of the Phu Yen district departments involved in the COS component. Aside form the 
interview with the vice-chairman of the FPD, this was not possible due to time constraints. Though 
the questionnaire provided an abundance of relevant data, it would have benefited from some 
editing.  
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Appendices 
 I 
 II 
Appendix 1: Map of Son La Province 
 III 
 IV 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire for model farmers 
 
This questionnaire is designed for a study conducted by a Danish student. The student has designed some questions 
about agricultural activities and livelihoods in the Phu Yen district. Please answer as accurately as you can and thank 
you for your time. 
 
1. General information 
a1. Full name:  Village:  Commune: 
a2. Position in household: 
a3. Gender: 
a4. Age: 
a5. Ethnicity of household (head of household and spouse): 
a6. Age of household members: 
 
Age interval (years) Members of household 
0-12  
13-18  
19-40  
41-60  
>60  
 
a7. Are you a member of the VDB?                       yes    no 
      
a8. What is the total area of your land (house, home garden, upland fields, paddy fields, forestry land), and have been 
given a Red Book for your land? 
 
Type of land yes/no Land use right (no. of 
years) 
Area 
Upland fields    
Forestry land    
Paddy rice land    
Home garden    
Other:     
 
 
a9. Wealth of household?     
 
Rich:   Medium:  Poor: 
  
2. General Production 
 
A. Paddy Land 
 
a1. Do you have paddy rice fields? 
 
   yes    no 
 
 
a2. How many crops of paddy rice did you plant in 2005? 
 
a3. How much did you harvest for each crop in 2005? 
 
B. Home Garden 
 
 V 
b1. Do you have a home garden? If no, go to C. 
    yes                              no 
 
b2 Which crops or fruit trees do you grow in your home garden? Are they sold? What was the harvest and the price 
received 2005? 
 
Crop/fruit tree Yes/no Harvest 
last year 
(kg or 
tons) 
For selling 
(yes/no) 
 
Price 
(VD/year) 
Longan     
Lychee     
Mango     
Pineapple     
Grapefruit     
Tea     
Other     
Other     
Other     
 
C. Forestry Land 
  
c1. Do you have forestry land? 
 
  yes    no 
 
If no, go to D. 
 
c2.  What is the area of your forestry land (in ha or m
2
)? 
 
Type of forestry land Area 
Land for planting forestry  
Land for natural regeneration  
 
 
c3. For which purpose do you use your forestry land? 
 
Purpose Type of tree Income (pr. year or period of 
time) 
Timber for selling   
Planting of protective trees   
For daily use of wood   
Agroforestry   
Grazing area for animals   
Other:   
Other:   
 
 
c4. Did you invest in forestry yourself or as part of a government program?  
    
  Self investment                    Program 
 
 
If through a program, which government program? 
 
327                 661                           other:___________________                            
 
 VI 
 
c5. What is the income from selling? 
 
  
Tree Total income pr. 
year 
Bamboo  
Keo  
Lat  
Teak  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
D. Animal husbandry  
 
d1. Do you raise any animals? If no go to E. 
 
Animal number Purpose Number 
sold in 
2005 
Income 
in 2005 
Place 
Ox      
Buffalo      
Pigs      
Chicken      
Goat      
Fishpond      
Other:      
Other:      
Other:      
 
E. Other income sources 
 
e1. Does your household have other income sources:     
    yes    no 
 
e2. If yes, which income sources are they? 
 
Income source Income last year 
(pr. month or year) 
Fishing  
Labor on other 
villagers fields 
 
Off-farm labor (i.e. in 
nearest town) 
 
Food processing 
service 
 
Trading  
Weaving  
Boat service  
Other:  
Other:  
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3. Upland cultivation 
F. Upland crops 
 
f1. Which cash crops did you grow on your upland fields in 2005? What is the area, the yield and the income? 
 
Crop Area (Kg of seeds 
planted 
Yield (in kg or tons)  Income Place for selling 
Maize     
Soybean     
Upland rice     
Cassava     
Other     
Other     
Other     
 
f2. How many harvests of upland crops did you have in 2005? 
 
Crops/No. of 
harvests 
0 1 2 3 
Maize     
Soybean     
Upland rice     
Cassava     
Other     
Other     
Other     
 
f3. How were the yields of upland cash crops in 2005 compared with 2 years ago? 
 
Better   Same  Worse 
 
f4. How were the yields of upland cash crops in 2005 compared with 5 years ago? 
 
Better   Same  Worse 
 
f5. How were the yields of upland cash crops last year compared with 10 years ago? 
 
Better   Same  Worse          Don‟t know  
       
 
f6. How far away from your home are your upland fields (km or hours walking time)? 
 
 
G. Soil erosion 
 
g1. Is soil erosion a problem on your land? If no, go to g4. 
   yes    no 
 
g2. If yes, what effects of soil erosion can you see? 
 
Effects of soil erosion yes/no 
Seeds are washed out by the rain  
The soil has bad quality  
Slow growth of crops  
Low yields  
Other:  
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Other:  
Other:  
 
g3. Why do you think soil erosion has happened on your land? 
 
Cause of soil erosion yes/no 
Lack of plant cover to prevent 
washing away of soil 
 
Lack of techniques to prepare the 
land 
 
Lack of forest cover on hills  
Other   
Other  
Other  
 
g4. Do you let your upland fields rest (fallow)?     
    yes    no  
 
g5. For how long do you let your upland fields rest (fallow)?    
 
Crop 1-2 years 3-4 years 5-6 years 7-8 years >8 years 
Maize      
Soybean      
Upland rice      
Cassava      
Other      
Other      
Other      
 
g6. How do you know when it the time is right for cultivating on your upland fields again? 
 
H. Inputs 
 
h1. Do you buy inputs for your cash crops every year?    
   yes    no 
 
Inputs yes/no Expense 
pr. year 
Where With 
own 
money  
With 
borrowed 
money 
With credit 
Maize (LVN10)       
Maize (Bioseed9698)       
Maize (DK98)       
Maize (DK888)       
Soybean (DT88)       
Fertilizer       
Insecticide       
Herbicide       
Other       
Other       
 
 
 
 
h2. Do you apply manure or fertilizer on your upland fields? How much do you apply? 
 
Crop Animal Chemical Do not 
 IX 
manure 
(kg/m
2
) 
fertilizer (N-P-
K) (kg/m
2
) 
apply 
Maize    
Soybean    
Cassava    
Upland rice    
Other:    
Other:    
Other:    
 
I. SALT models 
 
i1. How did you learn about SALT?  
 
Event yes/no 
Cross visits to other villages  
Village meetings  
Training course  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
i2.  What made you decide to apply the SALT-model(s)? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
i3. If you participated in a training course, what are the most important things you learned from the training course? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
i4. Which SALT practices are you using? 
 
SALT practice yes/no 
Terracing with protective trees  
Contour furrows with protective 
trees 
 
Rock terracing with protective 
trees 
 
Sub-terraces with wild grass or 
peanut 
 
Green hedges  
Intercropping  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
 
 
 
 
i5. Which inputs does the COS project provide for you? 
 
 X 
Input yes/no Amount  
Seeds for maize   
Seeds for soybean   
Seeds for Leauceana and 
Trephocia 
  
Seedlings for pineapple   
Grass   
Fertilizer   
Labor support   
Other:   
Other:   
 
i6. Why do you no longer cultivate using traditional methods? 
 
Reason yes/no 
Yields are too low  
Often there is no harvest to sell  
Takes too much time  
Other  
Other  
Other  
 
 
i7. What effects on crop production have you seen by using SALT models on your own land? 
 
Effects yes/no 
Faster crop growth  
Larger harvest  
Seeds are not washed away  
Crops are not damaged by rain or 
soil movement 
 
Topsoil remains in fields  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
i8. How hard is the work using a SALT-model when preparing for the first crop compared with traditional cultivation 
methods? 
 
Much more:  More:  Same:  Don‟t know:  
 
 
Why?___________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     
i9. How hard is the work using a SALT-model when preparing for the second crop compared with traditional cultivation 
methods? (this question is only for Tan Lang commune) 
 
Much more:  More:  Same:  Don‟t know:  
 
 
Why?___________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
i10. How expensive is it to use a SALT model in comparison with traditional cultivation? 
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Much more:  More:  Same:  Don‟t know: 
 
 
i11. How complicated is it to use a SALT model in comparison with traditional cultivation? 
 
Much more:   More:  Same:  Don‟t know:  
 
 
i12. How has the area for planting changed when using SALT in comparison with traditional cultivation? 
 
Increase:  Same:  Decrease 
 
 
i13. In your own opinion, which SALT models that you know are most effective? 
 
SALT practice Effective 
(yes/no) 
Terracing with protective trees  
Contour furrows with protective 
trees 
 
Rock terracing with protective 
trees 
 
Sub-terraces with wild grass or 
peanut 
 
Intercropping  
Green hedges  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
 
i14. Why do you think they are 
effective?________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________  
i15. Why do you think they are not 
effective?________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
i16. Are there any changes you would like to make to the SALT models you are currently 
using?___________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
i17. Have you been teaching other farmers about your SALT-models?   
 
No, 0 farmers  
1-3 farmers  
4-6 farmers  
7-9 farmers  
10-14 farmers  
15-20 farmers  
>20 farmers  
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If yes, how? If no, why haven‟t you been teaching other 
farmers?_________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
i18. How many farmers do you know who have replicated a SALT-model without receiving inputs and support from 
COS project? 
 
None, 0 farmers  
1-3 farmers  
4-6 farmers  
7-9 farmers  
10-14 farmers  
15-20 farmers  
>20 farmers  
 
 
J. Institutional sustainability and support in the future 
 
j1. If you have problems concerning the SALT model you apply, who do you contact? 
  
Person yes/no How often  
VDB member   
Extension worker   
Other   
Other    
Other   
 
 
j2. What kind of support for SALT-model do you think you will need in the future? 
 
Support yes/no 
Financial support for inputs   
Technical assistance  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
j3. Do you use the village fund for financial support?    
    yes    no 
 
j4. If yes, what do you mainly use the village fund for? 
 
Usage yes/no 
To buy animals  
To buy seeds  
To buy fertilizer  
To pay for school for children  
Medical expenses  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
 
 
 
 
j5. Who would you contact in order to obtain loans or credits for SALT activities? 
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Source of loans/credits yes/no 
Village Fund  
Agricultural Bank  
Policy Bank  
Women‟s Union  
Farmers Union  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
 
j6. Do you hope that the VDB will help to secure inputs for households applying SALT in the 
future?________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
If yes, 
how?____________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
K. The future 
 
k1. What will be your two  main sources of income in the future? 
  
Income yes/no 
Upland cash crop cultivation  
Forestry and industrial crops (i.e. 
tea) 
 
Home garden  
Paddy rice  
Fishing  
Animal husbandry  
Other  
Other  
Other  
 
 
k2.  What kind of upland cash crops will you grow in the future? 
 
Upland crops yes/no 
Maize  
Soybean  
Cassava  
Upland Rice  
Other:  
Other:  
Other:  
  
Thank you for your time    Date: 
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Appendix 3: Key informant interview Guide 
 
 
 
Interview with leader of AES 
 
1. What is your position in the AES? 
 
2. How long have you worked for the AES? 
 
3. What was your job before working for the AES? 
 
4. What are the main tasks and responsibilities of the department? 
 
5. Which departments, mass organizations, or people do you cooperate with? 
 
6. What tasks and responsibilities do you have concerning SALT activities? 
 
7. Which institutions do you cooperate with regarding farming activities in the Phu Yen district? 
 
8. What activities will be carried out by the AES this year? 
 
9. What kind of support, technical or otherwise, are you able to give farmers who apply SALT-
models in the COS project area? 
 
10. How often do the extension workers visit the project communes and villages? 
 
11. Is the cooperation with the VDB working well at the moment? 
 
Why or why not? 
 
12. What kind of improvements might be needed? 
 
13. Have the extension workers identified any difficulties about implementation of SALT in the 
project villages? 
 
14. What difficulties have they expressed? 
 
15. How will the AES be involved in SALT activities in the area in the future? 
 
16. In what way will AES be involved? 
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Appendix 4: Province map of Vietnam 
 
 
